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Abstract
Causes and Consequences of the 1909-1910 Steel Strike in the Wheeling District
Louis C. Martin
This thesis is a study of the failure of trade unionism in the Wheeling District mills in the
early twentieth century, a district whose unions had previously enjoyed great success.  The
conversion to tin plate in the district was, at first, beneficial to the skilled workers in the union,
but with the combination of companies culminating in the creation of the United States Steel
Corporation, the union could no longer count on the skill of its members for survival.
Ultimately, Wheeling steelworkers were victims of the modernization of the steel industry and a
union that would not adopt industrial unionism to maintain its position in the new corporate
environment.
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Introduction
On June 1, 1909, the workers of the LaBelle tin mill in Wheeling, West Virginia, arrived
at work to find a notice announcing that after “careful consideration of the interests of both the
company and its employees,” commencing July 1 the mills of the American Sheet and Tin Plate
Company would be run as “open” shops.1  Across the Ohio River in Aetnaville and Martins
Ferry, Ohio, the same notice was posted on the Aetna-Standard and Laughlin plants, as well as
the many other union plants of the company.  At midnight on June 30, the contract between the
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers and the American Sheet and Tin Plate
Company expired, and the workers at the union plants walked out in a strike that would last
fourteen months.  It was the last chapter in a decade-long effort of the United States Steel
Corporation, the parent company of American Sheet Steel and Tin Plate, to drive the union out of
all its mills.  When the strikers returned to work in the fall of 1910, not a single U. S. Steel plant
remained unionized.2
Before the 1909-1910 strike, steelworkers in the Wheeling district had remained heavily
organized while at a national level the union fell from its place of dominance in the early 1890s
when the Amalgamated Association had about 24,000 members and represented about one-half
of the steel industry.3  The turning point for the union was the 1892 Homestead strike, a defeat
that led the way for other steel companies to break the union in their mills.  In one mill after
another in Pittsburgh, the companies drove the unions out until by 1901 all of the steel mills in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, the largest steel producing county of the world, were non-
union.4  Whereas the union movement in the iron industry had started in Pittsburgh and spread
out to all the secondary mill towns like Wheeling, now Pittsburgh led the open shop drive that
spread and engulfed mill after mill, city after city.
The idea of the open shop was that the workplace would be open to both union and non-
union workers alike, but the company would not recognize the union nor sign a contract with
one.  While the open shop was not a new idea, it was now “invested with powerful ideological
overtones.”5  Management argued that collective bargaining denied individual workers the right
to decide whether they wanted to be members of the union or not, but the open shop gave
workers the opportunity to choose thereby protecting their individual liberty.6  However, the
2strikers in the Wheeling district, much like those in New Castle and other strike centers, viewed
the open shop announcement of 1909 as the latest example of how the laboring classes were
being disfranchised and oppressed by industrial capitalism.  Their fortunes had not risen along
with the industrial progress of the U. S. through the last decades of the nineteenth century and
into the twentieth, and many steelworkers viewed their union as the only means of achieving a
better life.  With the loss of the strike, they found themselves divided allowing independent steel
companies to adopt the open shop inaugurating the non-union era of the U. S. steel industry that
lasted until the Great Depression.
Chapter One: Rise of the Tin Plate Industry in the Wheeling District
Wheeling’s industries developed steadily throughout the nineteenth century.   Located on
the Ohio River and the National Road, in the 1830s the town grew from a “minor commercial
town” to a center for manufacturing.1  While its economy grew increasingly diverse with glass,
pottery, and tobacco factories, iron became the primary industry, the one for which Wheeling
became renown.  With western territories being opened to settlement, the market for nails
expanded consistently through the 1820s and 1830s, and established eastern nail companies were
unable to compete in the western market because of the cost of shipping.  Consequently, the
number of eastern nails shipped west of the Allegheny Mountains “greatly diminished” while
production in Pittsburgh and Wheeling increased.2  The Civil War brought “unprecedented
activity and wealth” to Wheeling earning it the sobriquet of the “Nail City.”  As one historian
describes the era following the war:  “Vast armies had been mustered out and adventurous young
Americans were scattering themselves out over the face of their half-developed country,
following the railroads West across the prairies, building new homes by the million.  Nails were
in demand and the black smoke rolled in clouds from the chimneys of Wheeling’s mills.”3
Wheeling’s iron industry grew even more when some of the local companies began to
vertically integrate.  Before 1857, all of the pig iron used in the Wheeling district was shipped
down from Pittsburgh to be worked in local puddling furnaces.  Afterward, completion of canals
made it possible to ship iron ore from Minnesota across the Great Lakes and down to the Ohio
River.  This development, combined with the start of coke production in Connellsville,
Pennsylvania, made it more economical to produce the pig iron in the Wheeling district blast
furnaces than to buy it from Pittsburgh.4  Thus, local Wheeling district companies severed their
dependence on Pittsburgh by converting the ore into pig iron in blast furnaces, puddling the pig
iron into wrought iron, rolling the wrought iron into nail plate, and cutting the plates into nails all
locally.  The iron industry expanded south from Wheeling into Benwood and across the river into
Bellaire, Aetnaville, Martins Ferry, Mingo Junction, and Steubenville, Ohio.  The 1870s and
early 1880s was the “golden age of puddled iron and of the cut nail” and all the towns of the
Wheeling district were booming.5
4The 1880s would witness the pinnacle and rapid decline of the cut nail.  The decade
began with the Chicago Tribune declaring that the “growth of Wheeling during the last ten years,
considering the unprecedented depression in the iron business, is remarkable indeed.”6  By 1885,
the Wheeling district boasted over 200 puddling furnaces, 1,400 nail machines, and an annual
capacity of approximately 140,000 tons or 2,800,000 kegs of nails.7  When the price of iron ore
dropped from $13.03 per ton in 1880 to $8.10 in 1884, the price of pig iron followed.  Though
this initially meant increased profits from cut nails, it also led to ruinous competition.  The
number of nail machines in the United States increased 43 percent, from 3,995 in 1882 to 5,695
in 1885, and the increased competition led manufacturers to search for ways to cut costs.8
In Wheeling, manufacturers adopted the Bessemer steel process, thereby eliminating the
puddlers, or boilers as they were sometimes called.  Pig iron is brittle and unmalleable because of
the impurities retained from the ore and the carbon picked up from the blast furnace fuel.
Puddlers worked the pig iron in furnaces to burn out these impurities, producing blooms that
were reheated and rolled into nail plate among other things.9  Puddlers learned their trade through
an apprenticeship of several years.  Having a relatively rare skill, they made a high wage, and,
therefore, manufacturers saw tremendous savings in their elimination.  The Bessemer process did
not require skilled workers with years of experience.  Henry Bessemer found that blowing air
into molten pig iron burned out all the carbon impurities while keeping the metal molten.  He
also found that if the process were stopped at precisely the right time, steel was produced.  Later,
it was discovered that they could also make steel by burning out all the impurities and replacing a
certain amount of carbon.  This was a process controlled by managers, not workers.
Furthermore, it produced uniform metal, and on a large scale it could be done cheaper.10  Thus,
the puddlers became obsolete, although a few thousand remained to produce a special high
quality iron.
In the 1880s, Wheeling manufacturers began building Bessemer converters and cutting
nails from steel plates instead of iron, thereby eliminating the need for puddlers.  Unfortunately,
this was not the life-saving, cost-cutting measure the companies had hoped it would be.  The
steel wire nail, as it turned out, eventually replaced the cut nail.  Its cost was significantly less
and quality better.  Though Wheeling manufacturers had eliminated the highly paid puddlers
when they began cutting nails from steel plates, they still could not compete with the wire nail
5manufacturers.  In response, the Wheeling companies asked the nailers to take a pay reduction.
They promptly refused, and a strike ensued bringing cut nail production to a halt and allowing the
wire nail to capture nearly all of the nail market.11
Salvation for Wheeling’s nail factory owners came in 1890 with the McKinley tariff.12
The tariff included duties on tin plate that had been produced previously in the United States, but
American manufacturers could not compete with their Welsh counterparts.  During the latter half
of the nineteenth century, the tin plate industry exploded and Wales, at first, benefited the most.
New uses were found for tin plate such as tin receptacles for tobacco, cigarettes, and candy,
bottle caps, and especially canned food.  The increase in the number of tin plate manufacturers
and people employed in Wales is evidence of the “phenomenal growth” of the industry.  Between
1860 and 1891, the number of Welsh establishments doubled from 40 to 80, and the number of
people employed in the industry grew from 5,700 to 25,000.13  By 1890, Wales was undoubtedly
the world’s center for tin plate production and encountered little competition from other
countries.
After the tariff passed, the American tin plate industry grew rapidly.14  This was
significant for the former cut nail producers since their rolling mills could be more easily
converted to roll tin plate, whereas wire nails were the product of a completely different process.
Since wire nails were formed from bars instead of sheets, cut nail companies would have had to
retool their rolling mills as well as the nailing departments.  Some companies had already
switched to other products such as pipe, but the others quickly moved into the burgeoning tin
plate industry.  In the early and mid-1890s, the Wheeling Corrugating Company and the LaBelle
Company, both of Wheeling, added tin mills, and across the river during the same period, the
Aetna-Standard and the Laughlin Nail Works also added their own tin mills.15
Tin plate, simply put, is a “thin sheet of iron or steel coated with tin” and possessing “the
strength of iron or steel without the liability to rust.”16  (Terne plate, often produced in the same
mills, differed only in that it was coated with an alloy of tin and lead.)  The basic steel mills
made ingots that were reduced in thickness in the rolls of the slabbing mills.  The product, called
steel slabs or sheet bar, was then brought to the hot mill of the tin plant.  When they arrived they
were six to ten inches wide, three-eighths of an inch thick, and twenty inches long.  In the hot
mill of the tin plate plant they were reduced to sheets of less than a tenth of an inch thick.17
6These sheets were then coated with molten tin or terne.  After that, they were cleaned, polished,
boxed, and shipped out.  The process was complicated and required some of the most highly
skilled workers in the steel industry.
The production process in Wales as of 1890 was as follows: An individual mill consisted
of two furnaces and two stands of rolls (a tin plate plant would have many such mills though they
were often referred to collectively a single mill).  First, the slabs were heated in the roughing
furnace, removed in pairs when they were red hot, and sent through the first stand of rolls, the
roughing rolls.  The slabs would go through the roughing rolls alternately four or five times until
they had been rolled into thin sheets of 8 B. G. (Birmingham Gauge) or 0.152 inches thick.
During this stage, the furnaceman put the slabs in and decided when to take them out, the
rollerman put the sheets into the rolls and adjusted the rolls, and the catcher, usually a young boy,
gave them back to the rollerman after they had gone through the rolls.  After being reheated in
the same furnace, they were removed and put through the roughing rolls two more time which
reduced them to 14 B. G. (0.0785 inches).  To get the sheets down to the thin gauge required, the
sheets would be paired, or stacked one on top of the other, and put through the rolls together.
Toward that end, the fourth man on the crew, the doubler, would take the sheets and fold them in
half, flattening the folded edge with a “crocodile” squeezer which was connected to a main drive
shaft and ran continuously along with the rolls.  Thus, the doubler would have to synchronize his
movements with the squeezer.  At this point the roughing was done, and the once-doubled sheets
were put in the second, or “finishing,” furnace for reheating.18
The sheets were then removed from the finishing furnace and passed through the
finishing rolls.  Again they were doubled (four sheets thick now and a total thickness of 0.0785
inches), and the edge was flattened in the squeezer.  After reheating in the finishing furnace a
second time, the same operation was repeated, making a pack of eight sheets.  After a third and
final reheating in the finishing furnace, the packs was passed through the finishing rolls until they
were the required length.  The standard final product was 20 inches by 42 inches, and cut into
twenty-four sheets.19
From the hot mill, the sheets were then brought to the tin house.  Here men, women, and
children, some of whom were skilled and some not would finish the plates.  The first operation of
the tin house was shearing.  When the packs of sheets had cooled, they were put into “crocodile”
7shears (as opposed to the “crocodile” squeezer).  The shears were also connected to the main
drive shaft thereby opening and closing continuously.  As the sheets were cut to the right size, a
boy would bundle up the scrap.  Then the packs were sent to openers, women and young girls
who separated the individual sheets from one another.  The rolling and reheating process would
slightly weld the sheets together.  The openers would strike the corner of the pack against their
workbench, which would bend it, and separate the sheets with a piece of metal they held in their
hands.  Sometimes a heavy knife was needed on the ones that were stuck.20
After being sheared and separated, the sheets would go to the pickling mill where a bath
of sulfuric acid followed by one of water cleaned off the iron oxide that would build up on the
surface of the sheets.  The sheets were repacked before pickling and unpacked afterwards.  At
this point in the process the sheets are hard and brittle, so to make them tough they were put in
the annealing furnaces.  Seven or eight men packed them into cast-iron pots and conveyed the
pots into the furnace on a “forked carriage.”  In the furnace the sheets were subjected to intense
heat for ten to twelve hours before they were removed and sent to the cold-rolling department to
be given a smooth surface.  Becoming brittle yet again, the sheets had to be annealed a second
time, called “white annealing.”  (The first annealing was called “black annealing.”)  Once again,
iron oxide would have built up requiring a second pickling. The first pickling, called “black
pickling,” had a higher concentration of sulfuric acid than the second, or “white pickling.”21
The product, called black plate at this point in the process, was now ready for tinning.  At
this time in Wales they used the “five-pot” process.  The tinman, the washman, and the risers
stood in front of a long brick “dresser” with a series of five vats.  The first contained boiling
palm oil, in which the plates were immersed for one to five minutes, and when they were
removed, they were clean and more absorbent.  The tinman would put the plates in the palm oil,
determine how long they should remain there, and then transfer them to the second pot that
contained molten tin.  Again they remained for a few minutes, building up a layer of tin, before
being transferred to the third pot.  The third pot contained hotter and purer tin, and a second coat
was imparted to the plate.  Then the washman removed the plates and removed the excess tin
before dipping them in the fourth pot that contained the purest tin.  Finally, the riser put the
plates in revolving rolls that went through boiling grease.  The plates were removed from the
fifth vat, and, while still hot, young girls would pass them through an absorbent cleaning material
8to remove the grease and then polish them with sheepskins.  The tin plates were then sent to
women called assorters to be inspected, packaged, and shipped out.22
By 1890 this process had undergone two centuries of evolution.  There had been changes
in pickling, annealing, tinning, and hot rolling.  Originally, the black plates were pounded down
to the proper thickness with hammers, but the sheets were not properly uniform.  In 1728, a
Welsh manufacturer developed the method of rolling the sheets, and the superior product of the
Welsh mills began to displace tin plates produced elsewhere like Germany where hammers were
still being used.23
  
The most important change of the nineteenth century was the introduction of
steel; first Siemen’s soft steel in 1875 then Bessemer steel in 1880.  Because of its “greater
ductility, superior tensile strength, and smooth surface,” steel was far more suited to tin plate
production than iron.24  But regardless of the changes in the process, the skill of the workers,
developed and inherited over many years, was still essential.25
The tin plate industry though it had been established in the United States much earlier did
not thrive until the McKinley tariff passed in 1890.  One of the earliest efforts in this country was
a small establishment in Philadelphia that began operations in 1830, but the inability to compete
successfully with firmly established Welsh tin plate mills discouraged growth.26  It was not until
1873 that a tin plate mill was built in the U. S. to produce for the general market.  The United
States Iron and Tinplate Company and the American Tinplate Company were organized that year
and built plants in McKeesport (near Pittsburgh) and Wellsville (north of Steubenville on the
Ohio River), respectively.27  The American Tinplate Company sold their Wellsville works to W.
Dewees Wood of McKeesport and, in October 1874, the plant discontinued production of tin
plates.28  When operations started up again in 1880, the new owners produced only fine grades of
plate and sheet iron, without tinning them.  The Wellsville plants later resumed production of
black plates for tinning, but never again produced tin or terne plate at that plant.   Other mills
around the country were built, but like the Wellsville plant, met with little success in the tin plate
industry.29
The McKinley tariff heralded the beginning of an era of tremendous growth in American
tin plate production.  Agitation had begun in the late 1870s for a tariff on tin plate, and chief
among the agitators was W. C. Cronemeyer, secretary and business manager of the U. S. Iron and
Tinplate Company.  In June 1883, the American Tinned Plate Association was formed for the
9purpose of lobbying Congress to get the desired tariff.  It was mainly comprised of sheet iron
manufacturers hoping to expand their businesses.  The Association paid Cronemeyer and Charles
Gilpin, of the W. Dewees Company, an annual salary of $1000 each to manage the organization’s
“propaganda.”  Their efforts came to fruition in 1890 when Cronemeyer was asked to testify
before the Ways and Means Committee on the tariff.  With the help of William McKinley the bill
became law, and a 2.2 cents per pound duty on imported tin plate opened the U. S. market to
domestic producers.30  Old mills were resurrected and new ones constructed.  Production in
America increased from 2,236,000 pounds in 1891 to 849,000,000 pounds in 1900.31
The tariff was not the only reason for the growth of the tin plate industry.  While it
certainly provided the impetus for many to enter the industry, credit must also be given to the
growing American steel industry in general.  The rapidly falling price of steel up to that time
encouraged growth in all the branches of the industry.32  Between 1871 and 1901, American steel
manufacturers went from being inconsequential in comparison to Britain to eclipsing them.
Annual pig iron production in the U. S. was not one-sixth of that of Britain, but by the end of that
period the U. S. produced double that of British manufacturers.33  Regardless of the reason for its
growth, the tin plate industry offered a new opportunity for many manufacturers.
By the time the tariff was passed, the cut nail business was in serious trouble.  Wheeling
district companies had recognized this after 1886, and the following year the directors of the
Riverside mill in Benwood began building a pipe mill.  In August 1887, operations began, and
shortly thereafter it became the first plant to use Bessemer steel for pipes.34  The rest of the mills
were looking for alternate products as well.  As early as 1889, the Wheeling Iron and Nail
Company, which operated what was known as the Top Mill, considered buying wire nail
machinery from a mill in Syracuse, New York, but no action was taken, and as late as 1893 the
LaBelle Iron Works investigated converting to the wire nail.  The company president, Cecil A.
Robinson, observed that the “cut nail is fast being driven from the market,” and accordingly the
directors sent the superintendent to Roanoke, Virginia to inspect a wire nail plant that was up for
sale.  Once again, no action was taken.35  By the end of this transformation, not one company had
converted to steel wire nail production.
The first local company to start producing tin plate was the newly formed Aetna-Standard
Iron and Steel Company, located in Aetnaville, an unincorporated town between Bridgeport and
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Martins Ferry.  After the Aetna and Standard companies merged, they added a tinning department
to the existing sheet and black plate mills and began turning out tin plate in May 1893.36  Early in
1894, the Wheeling Corrugating Company started producing tin plate as well. Alexander Glass
and E. C. Ewing formed the company in 1890 with $10,000 capital.  They began buying black
plate from the Whitaker Iron Company, Ewing’s employer of twenty years, and producing
galvanized sheets and roofing.  In February 1894, they added a tinning department.37  In 1894,
the Laughlin Nail Company started work in Martins Ferry on a tin plate mill of five sets of hot
mills and five sets of cold rolls as well as the accessory equipment for pickling and annealing.  In
1895, the company built a tin house of eight stacks, and the first tin plate was produced that
summer.38  Lastly, Cecil Robinson had submitted a proposal in November 1894, at the meeting
of the directors that a tin plate plant of four hot mills be built.  By July 1895, the LaBelle Iron
Works had four hot mills, four stands of cold rolls, and six tinning stacks.39  A standard box of
American tin plate full of sheets contained 105 ½ pounds of steel and 2 ½ pounds of tin. The
LaBelle plant’s capacity was 2,300 boxes of tin and 500 terne weekly with the black plate made
in own rolling mill.  Wheeling Corrugating Co. could produce 1,000 boxes tin and terne weekly
on single shifts.40  The Laughlin plant had a weekly capacity of 3,600 boxes.41
Thus, in a few short years the focus of the iron and steel industry in the Wheeling district
switched from nails to tin plate.   The Laughlin and LaBelle companies built entirely new works
for tin plate.  The Whitaker and Aetna-Standard companies had already been in the sheet rolling
business, and the Aetna-Standard company added a tinning department.  The Wheeling Steel and
Iron Company went into sheet steel production on a small scale.  Bellaire and Mingo discarded
nails and began manufacturing bars for sheet and tin plate mills because few of them produced
their own bars.42  Additionally, small tin plate mills were built in Follansbee and Steubenville.  A
dipping plant (that did not produce its own black plate) was eventually built in Chester.  And the
Wellsville plant continued to produce sheet steel.  Tin mills were also built during this period in
Pennsylvania, Indiana, and throughout Ohio, which by 1900 ranked first, second, and third,
respectively, in tin plate production in the United States.43
Between 1898 and 1901, the steel industry went through a dramatic series of mergers that
resulted in the creation of U. S. Steel.44  The steel industry became increasingly competitive in
the 1890s.  The price of the steel billets, or slabs, that the tin plate companies consumed dropped
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from $1.52 per 100 pounds in 1890 to $0.82 in 1894, and reached its low point of $0.75 in
1897.45  But while the tin plate industry continued to grow, urged on by these dropping prices,
their prices dropped too.  In one year the price per box of tin plate (100 - 108 pounds) dropped
from $5.37 in 1893 to $4.89 in 1894.  By 1898 it reached a low point of $2.99.46  To exacerbate
the condition, there was a severe business depression in the mid-1890s.47  Tin plate
manufacturers found themselves in dire straits.
One tin plate executive later recalled that there was a “condition of excessive
competition, which simply meant that the strongest people, financially, and the best plants,
physically, would continue in existence, and some of the weaker ones would go into
bankruptcy.”48  Even the strongest were not realizing much return for their investment.  Daniel
G. Reid, who with W. B. Leeds owned the American Tin Plate Company of Elwood, Indiana,
agreed that “the competition between the old companies had become so strong, the business was
fast drifting into a condition where there was little, if any, profit.  There was a number of mills
losing money and very few of them making any, and it was a matter of the mills getting
together.”49
To reduce this cut-throat competition, tin firms moved to horizontally integrate the
industry.  The American Tin Plate Company was organized on December 15, 1898 with
$46,000,000 issued in capital stock bringing together “practically every tin-plate concern in the
country.”50  Not all the owners were eager to sell the companies they had created, and in some
cases the “controlling inducement to sell out” was the extremely high price they could get for
their plants, generally in the form of stock in the new corporation.51  It consolidated nearly forty
different companies that, in all, had more than 275 mills.52  The company had dipping works in
Pennsylvania (15), West Virginia (1), Ohio (9), Indiana (5), and Illinois (1).53  It employed
between 20,000 and 25,000 people in 1899.54
In Wheeling, the tin mills of the LaBelle, Aetna-Standard, and Laughlin were all acquired
by the new corporation.55  The directors of the LaBelle unanimously resolved to sell out for
$500,000 of preferred stock in the American Tin Plate Company, and the consent of the
stockholders was formally recorded on November 22, 1898.  In several cases, including all three
of the Wheeling district plants, only the part of the property with the tin mill was purchased,
12
leaving the rest of the plant to the original stockholders.56  The Wheeling Corrugating Company
remained independent, as did the Whitaker-Glessner Company, which produced black plates.
The new company went through some quick changes.  Some plants were shut down
shortly after the merger while others were expanded and improved.  In 1900, the company
operated 31 tin or terne dipping plants and 34 that manufactured black sheets (some obviously
did both).  In the United States there were a total of 57 plants, meaning that the American Tin
Plate Company operated more than half of them.  Its daily capacity on single turn was 1,527,050
pounds of tin plate and 433,950 pounds of terne plate.  On double turn, its annual capacity was
916,230,000 pounds of tin plate and 260,370,000 pounds of terne plate.57  The American Tin
Plate Company capacity in 1900 was almost as much as was produced in all of Wales in 1890,
when that country led the world.58
According to one executive, investors “hoped that their plants would be bought and
executives and superintendents hoped that they would be selected for fat jobs with the new
companies.”59  Some managers were fired, others promoted.  William T. Graham, who was the
president of the Aetna-Standard, became a vice-president of the American Tin Plate Company
(Later, he became the president of American Sheet and Tin Plate Company and, later yet,
president of the American Can Company).  Cecil Robinson, formerly president of the LaBelle
company became a district manager for the American Tin Plate Company, and Daniel Reid, who
had owned the original plant in Elwood, became the president of the new corporation. 60
Meanwhile, Cronemeyer, who had worked for so long to see the industry take root in the United
States, was not offered a position.
 The tin plate merger was only one of many.  Early in 1900, the American Sheet Steel
Company was organized with $49 million issued in capital stock to “take over the principal
manufacturers of steel sheets.”61  Other “finishing” mill mergers included the American Steel and
Wire Company, American Steel Hoop Company, and National Tube Company.  The sheet mill of
the Aetna-Standard was bought by the American Sheet Steel Company, and the Riverside mill
was bought by the National Tube Company.  In basic steel, the big three were Federal Steel,
National Steel, and Carnegie Steel.  National Steel was closely associated with the American Tin
Plate and American Sheet Steel companies, supplying the two finishing companies with basic
steel.  In order to compete with National, Federal and Carnegie Steel also began to invest in
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finishing mills.  When they all looked into expanding their companies to integrate transportation
and ore, company heads recognized that a new period of competition was beginning that might
mean the end of one or more of the enormous corporations.  Since the elimination of competition
had been one of the critical reasons for the mergers in the first place, the giants of the industry
began to look for a way to avoid unnecessary competition.  The result was the United States Steel
Corporation.62
J. P. Morgan, perhaps the most powerful financier in the world, took an interest in seeing
the corporation created.  The other interested parties, Elbert Gary of National Steel, Charles
Schwab of the Carnegie empire, and Judge William Moore who had arranged the tin plate
merger, all stood to gain by its creation.  The only stumbling block was Andrew Carnegie,
without whose company the colossus would be incomplete.  Once Carnegie agreed to sell his
company for $200 million, everything else fell into place.  Carnegie embarked on his
philanthropy career, Morgan became the final authority in the steel industry, and Schwab and
Gary were left to run the industry on a day to day basis.63
U. S. Steel brought more than half the iron and steel industry under one management.
Granted, U. S. Steel ostensibly did not produce a single ton of steel as it was only a holding
company, but there was little doubt that the executives of the corporation would closely oversee
the operations of all its subsidiaries.  While each president would retain control over their
subsidiary, they would report to the new board of directors.  Certainly there would be a lack of
uniformity at first, but the ultimate goal of the corporation would be to bring order to an industry
that had been so chaotic for so long.  It was the first billion-dollar company and the most
extensive the United States had seen.  At the time of its organization, it had an annual production
capacity of over 9.4 million tons of crude steel, 7.7 million tons of finished, rolled steel products,
several railroads with over 1,000 miles of track, a fleet of 112 lake ore vessels, between 500 and
700 millions tons of iron ore resources, over 50,000 acres of coking-coal lands, and a great
acreage of lands with other grades of coal.64  Included in this empire were eight (Wellsville,
Chester, Mingo, Martins Ferry, Aetnaville, Wheeling, Benwood) plants on the Ohio River
between Wellsville, Ohio and Benwood, West Virginia.
Henry Scott, an executive for the Wheeling Steel Corporation, later wrote:
The local plants that were bought by [U. S. Steel’s] subsidiaries necessarily lost their
purely local character and much of their historical importance to us.  They came to be
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directed from Pittsburgh or New York by men with little knowledge of or interest in
Wheeling.  They became cogs in a big machine, a machine in which the cogs have to
justify their existence by cold figures.  A billion-dollar corporation that must earn
dividends for its stockholders, that has unlimited resources and is tied to no district
sentiment or investment, will consider each community according to its economic
location and its temper with respect to labor.  Aside from soft coal, Wheeling has no raw
material to offer, and she is not advantageously situated with relation to important
markets.  The United States Steel Corporation has not increased its capacity in this
district.65
Chapter Two: The Decline of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin
Workers
Traditionally, workers in the iron and steel industry had controlled virtually every aspect
of the conditions of their employment, but as the nineteenth century drew to a close they saw that
control diminish greatly.  Up to the 1870s, they determined how they would produce the iron and
how much they would produce.  Skilled workers even determined who would be on their crew.
Puddlers, rollers, and the other skilled men worked directly for the company while their crew
worked for them.1  Seemingly, the only question that remained was how much they would get
paid, and even the way this was determined changed considerably.  Miles Humphreys, the
president of the puddlers’ union, the Sons of Vulcan designed the first sliding scale, which was
signed in 1865.  It based the puddlers’ wages on the price of bar iron, and, in turn, the workers
were paid according to how much they produced.  Humphreys later recalled that the “cost of
living and the cost of production did not enter into the consideration at all; only a fair proportion
of the profits or of the selling price.” 2
In the 1870s, as employers united in organizations for the purpose of dealing more
effectively with unions, the various craft unions found themselves at a disadvantage.  In 1874-75,
the manufacturers in Pittsburgh shut down their mills in an attempt to break the Sons of Vulcan.
They were able to start mills back up with “black sheep,” or non-union workers;  in this case, the
skilled ex-slaves from eastern Virginia were brought in to puddle the wrought iron.  The rollers,
heaters, and other finishers at the mills did not object and continued to work with the non-union
iron.  “You are enabling the manufacturers to fight the boilers,” pleaded one puddler warning that
if the puddlers were to lose the lockout that the other finishers “would next be attacked and
reduced.”3  The puddlers finally won the struggle, but it revealed the weakness of being
organized in separate craft unions.4  In 1876, just a year after the lockout ended, the
Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers was formed, bringing together the unions of
the puddlers, rollers, heaters, and nailers into one organization.  By the late 1880s, it became
what was probably the most powerful trade union in the United States.  The Amalgamated
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Association was well suited to the iron industry and even had a stabilizing effect on it, but it was
an organization “posited on an industry whose methods were fixed, manual, and uniform.”5
By the 1892 Homestead strike, all had changed.  As a result of the introduction of the
Bessemer converter, the skill of the worker was no longer the determining factor in the quality or
quantity of the product produced.  Thus, there was no longer an exclusive, elite set of men on
which manufacturers had to rely.  One British steel executive noted that the “various operations
are so much simplified that an experienced man is not required . . . The workmen in America do
not act upon their own judgement, but carry out the instructions given to them.”6
With the erosion of their skill, workers also witnessed the erosion of their control over the
iron and steel industry.  The Bessemer steel process set in motion a series of improvements that
would wrest control away from the workers.  John Jarrett, who was elected president of the union
in 1880, said that the introduction of the Bessemer steel process had resulted in the “complete
subjugation of labor to the will of the employers.”7  The Amalgamated Association tried to
accommodate to the employers.  “The Association never objects to improvement,” President
William Weihe said in 1894.  If changes “do away with certain jobs they make no objection.
They believe in the American idea that the genius of the country should not be retarded.”8
Unfortunately for the union, the new process did more than simply “do away with certain jobs.”
It completely changed the industry.  The Bessemer process was not based on the accumulated
experience or skill of the worker, but instead on the mechanics of the process.  Managers
determined the length of the blast, the amount of carbon to put back into the molten iron, and,
thus, the quality of the product.  By gaining control of the process, managers also found that they
could dictate how much they would produce.  Iron puddlers would generally made 550 pounds of
iron per heat and depending on the furnace and materials could usually fit five heats into a twelve
hour shift.9  In the new steel plants, Bessemer converters could produce five, ten, or fifteen tons
of steel in one blow of about fifteen minutes.10  Changes were not confined to the production of
the steel at the converters.  Managers found that steel, being uniform, was well suited to
mechanization throughout the industry.  Rolling mills were made into continuous operations, and
more skill was eliminated.  No longer did rollers in basic steel mills have to make judgments
based on the heat of the metal, the conditions of the rolls, and the quality of the iron.  In the
continuous rolling mills, steel was passed through a series of rolls, and the workers did little
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more than replace worn-down rolls.  During a twelve-hour shift in a slabbing mill, three men
now supervised the rolling of 600 to 1,000 tons of steel.11  Charles Schwab, a product of Andrew
Carnegie’s promotion system, claimed he could take a “green hand,” an intelligent farm worker
for example, and make a melter of him in six or eight weeks.  This is what enabled companies to
import strikebreakers to restart their mills.12  The mills of the past were filled with men of long
experience, but now, workers were more easily replaceable.
The only voice workers had in the conditions of their employment was through the might
of their union, and, as John Fitch observed in his study published in 1910, the story of the union
in the steel industry is the story of Homestead.13  The Homestead plant was built in 1881 and
purchased by Andrew Carnegie a few years thereafter.  The Carnegie Steel Company became
unique in the industry, and where the “great Carnegie Steel Company led, the others had to
follow.”14  Indeed, Carnegie had been leading the industry almost since he entered it in 1873
when the Edgar Thomson works, his first, was built.  Carnegie’s obsession with cost reduction
led to a higher rate of technological improvement, a higher rate of production, and greatly
increased competition among steel manufacturers in general.  Pools for output restriction and
price fixing were commonly formed with the hopes of bringing stability to the industry, but they
frequently fell apart when one party, often Carnegie, had an advantage over the rest.  Those
companies who fell behind in the competition were usually forced into bankruptcy while the
others remained profitable. The high pitch of competition combined with a fluctuating and
unpredictable market for steel products imbued on manufacturers the need to economize their
operations, and again, Carnegie led the way.  In 1897, a year when many plants were forced to
shut down, Carnegie Steel made $7 million in profits.15
Through the 1880s the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers had
expended a great deal of effort to organize the mills of the great Carnegie empire.  They had been
unable to gain a foothold in any plant built specifically for steel production.  The large plants of
Jones and Laughlin in Pittsburgh were unionized, but the locals were established before the
transition to steel.  With the Carnegie Steel Company it was a different story.  Locals were
established at the Edgar Thomson plant in Braddock only to be broken, and the same was true at
the mills of the Duquesne plant.16
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The only successful campaign was at Homestead where, by 1892, there were eight lodges
established and active.  A problem arose over wages in 1889, and, through much negotiation, was
settled with a temporary measure and a contract was signed for three years.  With each new
improvement in the process, for which Carnegie was renowned, labor and management struggled
over what portion of the increased production should be paid to the men.  Schwab pointed out
that no longer was increased physical exertion the reason for increased production.  Increased
production was based on enormous capital expenditures, and, for this reason, the benefit should
go to the company.17  With this in mind, the wage committee and the managers of the company
sat again at the negotiating table in 1892.
By this time, wages were not the only point of contention.  Management had grown
increasingly frustrated with the union.  Being “in the saddle,” the union was often able to impose
its will on the company, and union officials were inflexible on many issues that were of
paramount importance to foremen, superintendents, and executives.  Firstly, they were resistant
to changing the footnotes of the wage scale agreement that governed the workshop, job
descriptions, production restrictions, and procedure in general.18  This was more than a nuisance
to the managers as they competed with one another to modify the process, produce more, and
increase profits.  Furthermore, many frivolous grievances were brought before management, and
because of the union’s clout all of the grievances had to be addressed.  This abuse of power
undoubtedly left resentment among management for the whole process and not merely for the
individual claims they believed to be frivolous.19  Employers frequently complained that when
faced with a strong union they were not free to manage their own business.20
Thus, Carnegie Steel’s management had many reasons to dislike the union, and they
determined that the union must be broken.  When the 1892 negotiations began, Andrew Carnegie
left the country for an extended vacation in Scotland, leaving Henry Frick who was already
known as “the implacable foe of organized labor” from his days as owner of the Frick Coke
Company, responsible for dealing with the union.21  He made wage offers that were far below
what the wage committee could accept, and even when the committee was ready to compromise
he again undercut their offer, forcing the union to declare a strike.  While it seemed that the strike
was over wages, most knew that it was, in fact, over the right of the workers to organize.
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Before negotiations had even ended, Frick had contacted the Pinkerton Detective Agency
to send two hundred men to protect the strikebreakers who he intended to import.  When the
strikers discovered that the Pinkertons were approaching on barges on the Monogahela River, a
gunfight ensued and several people were killed.  Pinned down, the Pinkertons surrendered under
the condition that they would be safely transported out of town.  Strike leaders agreed, but when
the march of the now unarmed Pinkertons began down the streets of Homestead, violence
erupted.  While Frick had been previously unable to convince the Pennsylvania governor to send
the militia, he now had his excuse.  The town was in chaos, and lives and property were at risk.
The militia arrived and took control of the town.  The strikers had expected the Pinkertons would
be tried for murder, but none were.  In fact, the strikers were the ones tried as criminals.  If there
had been any doubt on whose side the government stood, it was now quite clear that the state had
aligned itself with the Carnegie Steel Company.22
Reeling from the company’s display of influence, power, and overt force, the
Amalgamated Association refocused its efforts.  No longer believing that they could trade blows
with large, influential companies, they focused on that which had given them strength in the past
-- their skill.  Having always been a union almost entirely comprised of skilled workers, the
union leaders saw strength in their skill.  Even at Homestead, only skilled men had been
organized, and the union simply had to count on the cooperation of the unskilled workers
employed at the plant.  Mills that still relied heavily on skill were less able than the Homestead
plant to use strikebreakers during labor conflict.  If skilled workers were needed and they went on
strike, no number of detectives and militia could start the mills up again.  Essentially giving basic
steel up as a lost cause, union officials sought to organize and retain the less technologically
advanced finishing mills, which included the sheet and tin plate mills.
The assault on the power of the workers continued through the rest of the 1890s.  Labor
saving devices reduced the number of unskilled workers needed, and other improvements
continued to reduce the need for skill.  Furthermore, Eastern European immigrants were being
brought in to work the unskilled positions.  They were initially a cheap and plentiful source of
labor, willing to work for starvation wages, but management reaped another benefit from them.
Americans and old immigrant workers, such as the Germans and British, harbored prejudice and
animosity toward the Eastern Europeans.  They did not speak English, did not come from trade
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union traditions (in fact most came from agricultural occupations in their former homes), and a
seemingly “unbridgeable gulf” separated them.23  Through their efforts to organize the
Americans, German, Irish, and Welsh employed in the finishing mills, the Amalgamated
Association began to recoup some of its membership losses by the late 1890s.24  Tin plate, in
particular, was especially well suited to the union because it still relied on skilled workers.
W. C. Cronemeyer claimed that “as soon as the manufacture of tin plates was commenced
in the United States, American enterprise and inventive genius took up the matter of introducing
improvements so as to reduce the labor involved, cheapen the cost of manufacture, and lessen
consumption of raw materials.”25  While changes were made, they did not radically change the
process.  For example, commonly in 1895, crews of laborers unloaded the slabs upon arrival at
the plant and put them on buggies.  The buggies were then pulled and pushed by other crews to
the furnace.  By 1910, it was common for cranes to do all the unloading, and narrow-gauge
locomotives to take the slabs to the furnace.26  Again, whereas crews of laborers would put the
slabs in the furnace and remove them, called “charging” and “drawing,” by 1910 one man
operated an electrically driven charging machine.27  Likewise, automatic roll tables and roller
conveyors replaced the need for laborers to transport the plates within the plant, from the furnace
to the rolls and from the rolls to the tin house.28  The use of electric cranes, according to
Cronemeyer, was one of the most valuable improvements.29
American manufacturers also made improvements to the existing equipment that
increased output.  For example, whereas Welsh rolls were nineteen inches in diameter and
twenty-four inches long, Americans, by 1895, had increased these dimensions to twenty-four
inches in diameter and thirty-inches in length.  The larger rolls increased the pressure on the
packs, enabling  sheets to be rolled longer and thinner per pass, and the rolls retained heat better
cutting down stoppages due to cracked rolls.  Americans were also able to cut the number of
passes from five to four.  The larger machinery increased the mill crew from four to seven with
the addition of the roller’s helper (or screw man), doubler’s helper, and heater’s helper.30  Even
with larger crews, between 1895 and 1910, the output per man in the plate mills increased from
1.15 to 5.96 tons per day.31
Incidentally, this was not applauded by all.  Can manufacturers complained that the tin
plate now produced by American manufacturers was no longer as high in quality as that formerly
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produced in Wales.  One complaint was the reduced amount of tin used.  Whereas five pounds of
tin were previously the standard amount used per one hundred pounds of steel, now only two and
one half were used.  The result, according to one canner, was that the “coating is very thin, that in
opening the tin, you would find the can more discolored inside,” thereby making food and other
products less appealing.32
While cranes and the other improvements reduced the number of strong backs needed and
increased output, management still had to depend on highly skilled workers in the hot mill and
semi-skilled workers in the tin house.  To establish plants in the United States, manufacturers
imported skilled Welsh workers who “brought over to America the traditions of strongly
organized labor.”33  The heater, called the furnaceman in Wales, was a highly skilled worker and
required “long experience and considerable practical knowledge of the heat treatment of metals.”
Furnace temperatures were “judged largely by the heater’s eye,” and a single error meant the
“loss of a valuable steel slab.”34  The roller in sheet steel and tin plate mills was another
occupation that remained virtually unaffected by the changes in the mills.  One description of the
job states:
This is a very responsible and highly skilled occupation, which requires a special
knowledge of the working of iron and steel that can be gained only by long experience.  It
is impossible to convey in a description the kind and degree of knowledge required to
produce uniform plates of the proper width and thickness on which the loss shall be as
little as possible.  The roller must be able to direct the heater when the slabs are not
heated properly.  There is no heavy manual labor required except during roll changes or
when there is trouble in rolling.35
One company executive conservatively estimated that if a worker was “real clever he can learn
the business in 3 years from the time he starts in.”36  Thus, while improvements being made in
the rest of the steel industry were reducing the dependence on skilled workers, in the hot mills of
the tin plate plants skill was still essential.
When the American Tin Plate Company was created, six of the plants were non-union,
but all but one of these were organized after a “token strike.”  The large Monessen plant was the
only one not included in the wage agreement.  The company insisted that the union make an
exception for the Monessen plant because they were attempting to roll tin plate continuously
there, and, hence, a negotiated wage that applied at all the other plants could be problematic at
one where a new process was in place.37  The union agreed to this, and, at first, the mergers did
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not seem to have been terribly detrimental to the Amalgamated Association.  Common laborers,
in fact, seemed to benefit from it as their wages advanced up to 20 percent at some mills because
the company had to bring some plants up to the scale rate.38   If union leaders put blinders on and
only saw their small corner of the whole iron and steel industry, they could be pleased with their
organization.  The American Tin Plate Company like the other finishing companies relied on
their skill and granted them plants that had not been previously union.
In the tin house, however, improvements were being made that lessened the need for
skilled workers.  The application of the tin coating as it was done in 1890 was by no means
mechanical, and everything had to be done in a particular way for a particular amount of time.39
Improvements in this area came from Welsh manufacturers not Americans.  First, zinc chloride
or tinning flux, as it was called, replaced the boiling palm oil because the flux was faster acting.
Because of this, there was no need for an extra pot.  Instead, the flux floated on top of the molten
tin, and a machine, loaded with plates, submerged them in the molten tin, passing through them
through a layer of the flux.  Furthermore, the revolving rolls of the machine regulated the amount
of tin imparted to the plates.  Thus, the tinning machine replaced skilled workers in the tin
house.40  As for the unskilled, they had to handle the plates while they were still hot and suffer in
the poorly lit and extremely hot mill. The young women that polished the plates were paid $1.10
per 100 boxes of 56 plates they polished, but the average output per day was between 50 and 60
boxes.  Thus, the unskilled workers were subjected to poor conditions for less than a dollar a
day.41
To try to better these conditions, the tin house workers formed the Tin Plate Workers’
International Protective Association of America (TPWIPA).  Their first convention met in
Columbus, Ohio in 1899.42  The TPWIPA was comprised of “tin men, risers, tin plate openers,
picklers, assorters, boxers, reckoners, tin house shearmen and all men working in tin houses, and
all men identified with our craft, except foremen.”43  The Amalgamated Association leaders had
advised the tin house workers to form their own union because they would better be able to
protect their interests.44  The original 1876 constitution of the Amalgamated Association had
excluded their membership to “Puddlers, Boilers, Heaters, Roll Hands, Nailors, Hammermen and
Helpers.”45  The following year “Tin-men, Picklers, Annealers, Washmen, Assorters, Hot and
Cold Staighteners, and Shearmen working by the ton” was added to the list, and the name of the
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union was changed to the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers.46  In 1879,
“Tin” was dropped from the name of the union, but the tin-men, washmen, assorters, and the
other tin house workers remained under their stated jurisdiction.47  In 1889, after years of an
increasingly more liberal inclusion of mill workers in the jurisdiction, the constitution was
changed to simply read “all men working in and around Rolling mills, Steel works, Nail, Tack,
Spike, Bolt and Nut factories, Pipe mills, and all works run in connection with the same, except
laborers, the latter to be admitted at the discretion of the Subordinate Lodge.”48  “Tin” continued
to be omitted from the name of the union until 1898, but, as the TPWIPA was formed that year, it
must have been included as reference to the men of the hot mills specifically.  Despite being
explicitly included in the early constitutions and implicitly included after 1889, the tin house men
and women remained largely unorganized until 1898.  Of the 21 tin plate plants in the U. S. in
1898, the tinning departments in only six of those plants were organized.  That year, Samuel
Gompers issued a call for a convention in Kansas City to create a national organization of the tin
house workers.  Nine delegates from the six locals met in December, and on January 17, 1899,
the TPWIPA was created.49
The tin house workers considered some among their ranks to be skilled and others
unskilled.  The question arose in the TPWIPA whether or not they should permit unskilled
workers, and officials contacted Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor
(AFL), to find out what his thoughts on the subject were.  Gompers advised them to accept the
unskilled workers as labor organizations should be broad embracing the principle of the
brotherhood of men.  He also warned them that if unskilled workers were refused membership
that that would come back to haunt them in times of trouble as companies would try to use those
workers to fill vacated jobs, as they were presumably somewhat familiar with various jobs
around the mill.  Thus, the TPWIPA accepted unskilled workers including women.50
Many predicted the TPWIPA would fail because their numbers were limited and they had
little trade union experience, but by their second convention in May, 1900, the union had thirty
different lodges.51  “Strength does not always find its seat in a large membership,” said George
Powell, president of the union in 1900, “but its efficiency lies in the righteousness of its cause.
Second, in the intelligence of its members to understand trade-union principles.  Third, the
devotion of the membership in upholding them at any cost.  Fourth, the great interest the
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members take in the affairs of the organization and their acquaintance with all the details
connected with it.”52  The TPWIPA had survived a rash of strikes against the American Tin Plate
Company for recognition, which they won.   Mistakes admittedly had been made, and the wages
negotiated with the company, due to the variances in the mills, hurt some members and unfairly
benefited others.  They had still, however, gained recognition, which, as Powell pointed out, was
something “that the men of the Carnegie mills, of Pittsburgh and vicinity, have been trying to
obtain for years.”53  Additionally, before the TPWIPA got their first scale signed, many of the tin
house workers were working twelve hour shifts.  By 1903, no tinners or risers worked longer
than ten hours on the day shift and eleven on the night shift, and more than thirty percent of them
had secured eight hour shifts.  The president in 1903, Charles Lawyer, said that the union’s
“pathway has not been strewn with flowers, by any means,” but they had accomplished a great
deal in a short amount of time.54
Both the Amalgamated Association and the TPWIPA had at first viewed the American
Tin Plate Company with considerable anxiety believing that the “concentration of so much
capital into the hands of one dictatorial management naturally gives it power to drive a hard
bargain and often an unfair one with labor.”  After their unions were recognized and their
contracts were renewed, the workers were relieved, but this relief was short-lived.  When orders
slacked off, more of them than ever found themselves idle.  Before, when demand declined, at
least the independents would try to continue operations to get their share of the market, but with
the corporation, it was more logical to shut down whole plants rather than run several part time.
Workers responded:  “What is only economy to you is starvation to us.”  Furthermore,
management could be very selective in choosing which plants to run leading one tin plate worker
to complain:  “Ostensibly we are idle through want of orders, but as a matter of fact we are
locked out because we will not work at a lower rate of wages, as do the men of Monessen, nor
turn out a larger output, as do the men of New Castle,” both of which were in violation of the
union’s constitution.  The workers’ opinion of the mergers was simple:  “If the American Tin
Plate Company can not practice its economies without the wholesale shutting down of mills, and
throwing hundreds of its employees out of employment, if it can not pay dividends on its
enormous issued stock without causing so much human suffering, then we say that the trust is
more of a curse than a blessing.”55
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The strategy of shutting down whole plants was used to an even greater extent by the
American Sheet Steel Company and its first president George McMurtry.  Sheet steel was a
generic term that included black plate production, and the American Sheet Steel Company
formed in 1900 to consolidate the production of most of the nation’s sheet steel.  While the
American Tin Plate Company owned the tinning department of the Aetna-Standard, for example,
its sheet steel mill was owned by the American Sheet Steel Company.56  By that time, the
Amalgamated Association had organized twenty of the twenty-seven plants of the American
Sheet Steel Company.  Its seven non-union mills ran to full capacity during 1900-1901, while
nine of the union mills sat idle.57  The company’s president, McMurtry, was much more
notorious for being anti-labor, and, naturally, many thought this was the reason for the selection
of plants to be run full.  In essence, the companies tempted workers to break union restrictions on
output and work for rates less than the union negotiated with the promise that their mill would
resume production. Rather than give tacit approval to violations or risk mutiny by fining
members, the Amalgamated Association amended their constitution at the 1900 convention to
read that “should one mill in a combine or trust have a difficulty, all mills in said combine or
trust shall cease work until such grievance is settled.”58  This measure was designed to bring
uniformity back to the working conditions in the various plants, but in effect it would later
handcuff union negotiators who would have to demand that all the mills of a particular
corporation be included in the agreement.
The Wheeling district, now almost entirely geared toward sheet and tin plate production,
remained extensively organized.  By 1900, from Wellsville down the Ohio River to Benwood
there were six complete tin plate plants, two dipping works (tin houses that were not attached to a
hot mill), two sheet mills (that made black plates without tinning them), and two plants that made
sheet bar.
  
Laughlin and Aetna-Standard each employed 2,000, and the LaBelle employed 500,
and all were represented by Amalgamated lodges.  There were two TPWIPA lodges in Martins
Ferry (Standard Lodge No. 9 and Ohio Valley Lodge No. 12) and one in Wheeling (Powell
Lodge No. 8).59  In 1899, organizer Thomas J. Irwin of Martins Ferry reported that their TPWIPA
local had secured the eight-hour day and an increase in wages.60  From the workers perspective,
the Wheeling district was solid.
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The creation of U. S. Steel in 1901, however, brought new insecurities.  The first question
was whether their plant would be kept running or whether it would be dismantled in the name of
efficiency.  In May, 1901, President Charles Schwab took a tour of the Ohio Valley to visit the
mills to decide that very matter.  His party went first to the Chester plant, the fate of which had
been uncertain for some time.  Aboard a special train, Schwab and his party then crossed the
river to inspect the Wellsville plant, then continued down to Steubenville, Mingo Junction,
Aetnaville, Bellaire, and finally to Wheeling.  Rumors that the Chester plant would be moved in
its entirety to Vandergrift, Pennsylvania, turned out to be false.  All the mills Schwab inspected
were to remain in operation.61
Meanwhile, at the end of May, the Amalgamated Association was holding its annual
convention in Milwaukee.  “It goes without saying that this is perhaps the most important
convention in the Association’s history,” the National Labor Tribune declared.  As the
constitution had been amended the previous year to insist that companies sign for all their mills,
the only question left as the amendment dictated was whether the wage scale committee should
meet only with representatives of U. S. Steel itself or if they should agree to meet with
representatives of the subsidiaries.62  Ultimately they agreed on the latter.
The executives of U. S. Steel had two main priorities:  bringing uniformity to the policies
of their subsidiaries and reassuring the public that the new corporation was good for America.
The recent merger wave had brought a negative reaction from the public and the government,
who were opposed to monopolies, and U. S. Steel bordered on being just that.  Executives argued
that the corporation was a purely a holding company owning the stock of the subsidiaries and
not, in reality, producing a single ton of steel.  Bringing uniformity too swiftly or indelicately
might strengthen the perception that the new trust did, in fact, dictate the policies of the
subsidiaries and, therefore, was a monopoly that posed a threat to fair competition.  U. S. Steel’s
executive had to be very diplomatic in their decisions during the early months of the
corporation’s history. 63
The officials on the Executive Committee of U. S. Steel also had contradictory
philosophies which fueled much debate at their meetings.  Like the union, they were also trying
to decide on a course of action in preparation for the upcoming scale negotiations.  At the time,
the Amalgamated Association was very strong in about one-third of the corporation’s plants.  U.
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S. Steel officials agreed that strikes had to be avoided in the early months, and they instructed
subsidiary presidents to sign reasonable scales for existing union mills only and to refuse to sign
for currently non-union mills.64  The question of the “labor problem” arose during the very first
committee meetings.  Some agreed that “a concern operating with a union was pretty badly
handicapped,”65 but one member of the committee argued “we will have to recognize the labor
unions everywhere sooner or later” because they were “here to stay.”66  Since the committee was
unable to agree unanimously on a labor policy, they decided that the “general policy should be to
temporize for the next six months or year until we get fully established,” and to leave unions at
the various plants undisturbed.67  This position was stated more explicitly during the June 17,
1901, meeting of the Executive Committee when they resolved that “we are unalterably opposed
to any extension of union labor and advise subsidiary companies to take firm position when these
questions come up.”68
It became impossible to “temporize” as the Amalgamated Association sensed that an
opportunity to extend its organization existed that would soon vanish.  Union leaders were aware
that U. S. Steel was still trying to create uniform conditions in its mills and needed to gain the
public’s approval as they were at risk of being labeled a monopoly.69  Workers also believed that
with the creation of the corporation managers could no longer afford to suffer through a strike
because the price of their stock would fall.  The logic was that previously owners personally
suffered a short term loss of profit during strikes, but now executives could no longer make this
sacrifice since they answered to stockholders.  Accordingly, now with many different plants
coming under the control of a small group of executives concerned about the public and the
stockholders, the union seemed to have an opportunity to organize all the mills that might never
come again.70  Thus, they acted aggressively.
When negotiations began the wage committee and President T. J. Shaffer demanded that
the American Tin Plate Company sign the agreement for all its mills.  Once again, the company
pointed out that the Monessen mill was unique and could not be included on the same wage
scale.  The union reiterated that all mills should be included in the agreement.  In response, the
company promised to sign an agreement for the Monessen plant if the American Sheet Steel
Company signed for all its mills.  With this verbal proviso, the union conceded, and the
agreement was signed on June 21, 1901, after a surprisingly brief conference.71  The Association
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made the same offer to the American Sheet Steel and American Steel Hoop companies.72  On
June 26, the American Sheet Steel Company offered to sign for all the mills on the previous
year’s scale minus two mills (Saltsburg and Old Meadow) which, the company argued, had
abandoned the union.  At a second conference on June 29, American Sheet Steel Company
representative, Persifor F. Smith, made the same offer.73  T. J. Shaffer came out of the conference
furious saying that Smith “sat there like a great judge without a jury, and whatever he decreed
was law.”  Since Smith showed no willingness to compromise, Shaffer and the wage committee
had no choice.  Shaffer announced publicly:  “I have preached conservatism and held to it for
three years, but in return we get nothing but subjugation and humiliation, and now we revolt.”74
Shaffer ordered the men of the sheet and hoop mills out on strike July, 1, 1901, though
only some of the hoop mills in Ohio were organized at the time.  The same day, Shaffer sent a
letter to Warner Arms, vice-president of the American Tin Plate Company that unless the strike
was settled by Monday, July 8, that it would be his "very, very unpleasant duty to call from their
work all of your workmen who are members of the Amalgamated Association.”75  An estimated
38,000 workers from the sheet and hoop mills answered the call.76  The Amalgamated
Association had judged U. S. Steel’s vulnerability well.  Elbert H. Gary, chairman of the
Executive Committee, said that it was the “very worst time of the very worst year to have any
trouble,” and on July 8 the Executive Committee voted to compromise with the union.  Shaffer
agreed to postpone his deadline until after the conference, which was scheduled for July 11.  The
Executive Committee planned to settle on the “very best terms possible and as quickly as
possible,”77 but the union became convinced of the opposite.  Just before the conference, twelve
men at the Wellsville plant were discharged for trying to form an Amalgamated lodge leading the
union to believe that U. S. Steel intended to break the union because.  Shaffer retorted that there
would be no conference until the twelve men had been reinstated.78
Now the Executive Committee had to decide whether they should direct the subsidiary to
reinstate the twelve men.  By now, two schools of thought had developed among the committee
members as to how to handle the labor problem.  One group came from the era of the Homestead
strike and had developed an unflinching hatred of unions.  “I have always had one rule,” said one
U. S. steel executive.  “If a workman sticks up his head, hit it.”79  The president, Charles Schwab,
epitomized this group.  He started working in a steel mill at the age of 17 and rose through the
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ranks of the Carnegie competition and promotion system.  He had little sympathy for the workers
and nothing but animosity for unions.  For these steelmen, preventing labor troubles meant
attacking unions through discharge, espionage, and intimidation.80  One such executive asserted
in a Committee meeting that “long experience” had taught him that “if certain situations which
naturally arise from time to time be not quickly disposed of on the spot with a firm hand, you will
then witness the beginning of the end.”81  The second group was comprised of financially minded
men like Elbert Gary who believed in earning the loyalty of the workers through fair treatment.
They argued that good wages, safe work environments, and other benefits would prevent work
stoppages and bring labor and capital closer together.  Furthermore, they believed that their
philosophy was more honorable unlike the brick-bat tactics of the steelmen.  One belief that both
schools shared was that, in Gary’s words, there was “no necessity for labor unions.”82
Gary felt that the present situation was an example of how the steelmen’s philosophy was
flawed.  He commended the tin plate executives on their “admirable management of their
business,” and said that if Daniel G. Reid, president of the American Tin Plate Company “had
been in charge of the business of the hoop and sheet mills he would have settled this long ago.”
After much debate Gary’s clique won the day, and the committee resolved to reinstate the twelve
men who had been discharged in Wellsville and to concede three mills to the union.83
When the Amalgamated Association met with company representatives in Pittsburgh on
July 11, 12, and 13, the union continued to demand a contract for all the mills and agreed to
make special previsions for the Monessen plant.  They also assured the company that if there
were to be strikes with independent companies in the future that the Association would not call
any sympathy strikes against U. S. Steel.  The company offered to sign an agreement that
included sheet mills at Scottdale, Saltsburg, McKeesport, and Wellsville.  This would have
reduced the number of non-union sheet mills to five of twenty-three which would have given the
union six more than they had had, but the company only offered to sign for the hoop mills that
had been signed for the previous year.  Unfortunately, the Association had already decided they
must have a company wide contract, and furthermore, some of the non-union hoop mills had
been organized during the strike.  The union decided that these new lodges could not be
abandoned, and the offer was rejected.84
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U. S. Steel now had a very convincing argument to put forth to the public.  Executives
claimed that they did not refuse the right of the workers to organize, but that there were many
men who did not “wish to become association members” and that “they must respect those men
in their wishes.”  The company had offered to concede more mills to the union than previously,
but according to company officials, the union was unwilling to compromise.  After the
conference Secretary-Treasurer John Williams of the union saw the situation entirely differently:
“I have always maintained a conservative position in regard to industrial struggles, but the time
has now arrived when the Amalgamated Association recognizes that it has a principle to
defend.”85  On July 15, Shaffer called out the tin plate workers, thereby breaking the agreement
he had already made with the American Tin Plate Company.
The contest was shaping up to be one of obvious importance to labor everywhere.
Pittsburgh District President Patrick Dolan of the United Mine Workers of America pledged the
support of the 50,000 or more miners in the Pittsburgh district who were willing to go out on a
sympathy strike if the Association so desired.86  Samuel Gompers met with T. J. Shaffer and
offered him the moral and financial support of the American Federation of Labor.  Gompers also
offered AFL organizers to be wherever Shaffer needed them, but Shaffer was confident that the
union could win the struggle without extra organizers; later, many contended the Amalgamated
officials had been “overconfident.”87
Two weeks after Shaffer called the tin plate men out, negotiations resumed in New York
City at J. P. Morgan’s office on July 27.  Shaffer and Williams were impressed with Morgan who
told them that essentially he was on their side, but that change must come slowly.  Shaffer and
Williams signed an agreement with Morgan for the plants that had been on the previous year’s
contract, which did not even include the four additional plants offered on July 13.  Morgan
thought the agreement was binding and was outraged when he learned that the union’s Executive
Board voted it down.88  The entire Executive Board then went to New York and proposed to
Morgan that the scale include only the mills where the men had gone out on strike, thereby
showing a willingness among the workers to belong to the union.  This would have included
most of the hoop mills, all the tin plate mills except Monessen, and all the sheet mills from the
previous year plus Wellsville and McKeesport, but not Saltsburg or Scottdale.  Morgan flatly
refused.89
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Now the union had nothing to lose.  Before the Executive Board left New York City, they
instructed Shaffer to call for a general strike against U. S. Steel, which he did.  On August 6,
Shaffer issued a statement charging that the “United States Steel Trust” had refused to recognize
as union men those “who are now striving for the right to organize.”  He asked that all
“Amalgamated and other union men in name and heart” join the fight for labor’s rights or “give
up forever our personal liberty.”  He argued that while many of them had signed contracts, they
did not agree to surrender them to U. S. Steel whose “officers think you were sold to them just as
the mills, contracts and all,” Shaffer declared.90
Two days later, Shaffer asked Gompers to make the steel strike “the central fight for
unionism.”91  Gompers refused, and he, John Mitchell (the national president of the UMWA),
and a committee from the National Civic Federation (NCF) began to work toward a settlement of
the strike.92  The NCF was an organization designed to bring capital and labor closer together.
Thus, it was their desire to see an end to the present strike and a return to more peaceful relations.
The miners would not come out in a sympathy strike, and Shaffer had no other way to advance
the strike.
Nevertheless, the Wheeling district was solid.  Of the eight plants between Wellsville and
Benwood, all were now organized; the Wellsville plant being organized just after the strike
began.  In forty-eight hours, two union officials, at the request of the Wellsville workers,
chartered a new lodge with forty-four members.93  All the other lodges of the Wheeling district
had long been established, and there was a great deal of local support for the strikers.  Mingo
Junction mayor W. J. O’Donnell said, “I am with the Amalgamated Association men in this fight
to the end.”94  On August 14, President Shaffer addressed an “immense meeting” of strikers and
union sympathizers at the Wheeling Island fairgrounds.  Bands played as the Bellaire and
Benwood delegations led a parade that started at the Stamm Hotel at 2:30 p.m. and was joined by
the Wheeling and Martins Ferry lodges en route to the fair grounds.  At each factory, the cheers
of the crowds attested to the “popular favor” for the strike.  “With us it is a matter of principle,
but with the other side it is a matter of dollars and cents,” Shaffer told the crowd.  “The trust
can’t run the mills without you.  There is not enough skilled labor left to make more millions for
these men who have centralized capital.”95  The Ohio Valley Trades and Labor Assembly, a
coalition of local trade unions chimed in with their support.  The Assembly denounced the Labor
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World, a Pittsburgh newspaper, for attacking Shaffer and declared that the “future existence of
organized labor depends on the outcome of this difficulty.”96  By now, between six and eight-
thousand workers in the Wheeling district were on strike with only about five hundred remaining
at work in the Riverside tube plant in Benwood.97  The strike was accompanied by “considerable
violence,” and the “local plants characteristically supplied their full quota” according to one
historian.98
While the strikers in Wheeling had the public’s support, that was not the case
everywhere.  The call for a general strike alienated many who viewed breaking contracts as
dishonorable.  The popular magazine The Nation, for example, was highly critical of the union
and the general strike order.  “Whatever doubts there may have been about the real issue in the
steel strike, they were all swept away by President Shaffer’s strike order,” one of its writers
contended.  The author criticized the union for trying to “coerce” men into their labor monopoly
which would prevent workers from getting employment without first bowing to their
organization.  He concluded that such a strategy “stabs free labor to the heart and holds a dagger
to the throat of property.  An insolent union, aiming at a labor monopoly, rises up boldly in the
face of capital and says, ‘It is one or the other of us now.’  To that there can be but one answer.”99
By the beginning of September, the strike was in trouble.  Shaffer’s call for a general
strike did not bring enough workers away the rest of the mills to greatly affect the corporation.100
The Wellsville plant among several others had been reopened with strikebreakers.  The
Wellsville mayor, at the request of D. S. Brookman (the manager of the works that had the
twelve Amalgamated men discharged in July), made thirty of the strikebreakers deputies.  He
said that he did so at the request of the officials of the American Sheet Steel Company to protect
the company’s property and the strikebreakers themselves.101  Soon, the men at Wellsville were
broken, and the plant was running again.
Gompers and the NCF got the company to agree, on September 4, to sign for all the
plants still on strike, but Shaffer refused.102  This would have meant a considerable loss, but after
the offer U. S. Steel was able to restart two more mills, the Canal Dover and Demmler works.103
When Shaffer finally came to U. S. Steel to negotiate on September 14, the corporation offered a
three-year agreement for those still on strike, meaning Shaffer had to sign an even worse
agreement than that secured by Gompers on September 4.  Shaffer issued a circular giving as
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reasons for the failure the demoralizing lies printed in newspapers, the betrayal by Amalgamated
men who worked as strikebreakers, and the AFL’s abandonment of their cause.  “The A. A. still
exists, but it must be strengthened,” he lamented.104
Gompers took offense at Shaffer’s remark that the AFL had not given the Amalgamated
“one cent” arguing that he had offered full financial support and told Shaffer that he only needed
to apply for it.  Gompers claimed Shaffer did no such thing and had instead Shaffer had sent his
own requests for financial support directly to AFL affiliates.  Gompers also criticized him for not
accepting the September 4 offer that he, Mitchell, and the NCF had obtained for him which
would have allowed the Canal Dover and Demmler mills to remain unionized.  Shaffer had also
said that Mitchell promised to order a sympathy strike of the miners if U. S. Steel did not accept
one offer they had drafted together.  Once U. S. Steel had rejected it, Mitchell’s promise turned
out to be false.  Gompers said Shaffer had threatened U. S. Steel with the sympathy strike
without any such promise from Mitchell.105
In the end, all the finger-pointing and accusations were irrelevant.  The final settlement
the Amalgamated Association signed was one “from which the union never recovered.”106
Union leaders had miscalculated the corporation’s reliance on the skilled workers.  One official
claimed they lost the strike because of U. S. Steel’s “evident willingness to spend millions to
teach green labor to become experienced and skilled.”107  The union had hoped for a plunge in
the stock market and more public interest, but neither of those factors came to fruition.108
Because of all these terrible miscalculations, the union lost fifteen plants, and much more.109
First, the strike completely depleted their treasury.   Second, as part of the settlement, the
union agreed not to attempt to extend its organization to any of the U. S. Steel plants that were
non-union.110 The loss of the 1901 strike also did considerable damage to the morale of the men.
One example is the experience of the men in McKeesport.  They had been struggling for
recognition since 1882.  That year a lodge was formed and disbanded the same year.  This was
repeated in 1886 and 1891.  Again in 1900 a lodge was secretly formed at the Dewees Wood
plant, but when officials learned of it several were discharged and the lodge was broken.111  In
July 1901, both the Wood plant and the tube works there made a “last stand” for unionism and
were the only mill in Allegheny County to join the strike.112  They probably came out because
McKeesport was one of the few mill towns where U. S. Steel did not dominate the local
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government.  For the workers’ participation in the strike, the corporation threatened to dismantle
the Wood plant.113  The plant was restarted, however, after the strike, and the president of the
lodge was blacklisted from every plant of the corporation.114
Others who were not blacklisted had to sign ironclads or yellow dog contracts to get their
jobs back.  One such man had been a strike leader during the 1901 affair and went back to work
knowing that the mill would be non-union.  He had received letters of encouragement from
nationally recognized labor leaders during the strike, but when asked what he had done with the
letters he replied:  “I burned them when I came back to the mills.  . . .When I came back here, I
knew I was coming to a non-union mill and I took a job in good faith as a non-union man.  That
is a chapter in the history of my life that is ended.  The whole matter of unionism is a thing of the
past, and as an employe in this mill, I have no part in it.”115  Thus, there was a loss to the union
that was not measurable in the terms of the settlement or in the number of plants included.
Michael Tighe, who originally worked for the Wheeling Iron & Steel Company and later
became president of the Amalgamated Association, said that during this period, the union’s
policy in business relations consisted of “giving way to every request that was made by the
company when they insisted upon it.”116  U. S. Steel quietly rid itself of many local lodges by
shutting plants down until the workers signed contracts disavowing any connection with any
labor organizations.  The union was powerless as more and more of the plants fell to this method
that was dubbed “starvation and petition.”  The last of the basic steel mill charters was
surrendered in 1903.117  Also, the Monessen system of tin plate production was extended to other
plants during this time, which according to the workers, “involves a heavy reduction of wages,
reduces the number of highly skilled rollers by one-half, increases the number of men at work
and increases the tonnage.”118  Another blow to the union came in 1904 when they were forced to
drop all production restrictions from the footnotes of the wage scale agreement.  Also, in 1904,
the two subsidiaries, the American Tin Plate Company and American Sheet Steel Company,
merged to form the American Sheet and Tin Plate Company bringing them under one
management headed by the president of the sheet steel company.  Lastly, the tube works all
became non-union plants in 1907 and 1908.119
The situation only became worse for the union, which became an increasingly exclusive
organization of the highly skilled and highly paid.  The remaining puddlers, frustrated by the lack
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of concern that the union leaders (now mostly from the ranks of the finishers in steel mills) paid
to them, withdrew from the Amalgamated in 1907 and reformed the Sons of Vulcan.120  In 1907,
a business depression called the “Banker’s Panic” dealt a blow to the steel industry, and workers
suffered an extended period of idleness.  In 1908, Walter Larkins of the AAISTW took a tour of
various mills and found several of them idle as the industry was still feeling the effects of the
depression.  “Where is the full dinner pail,” he asked.121
Through these years, Elbert Gary and Charles Schwab continued to struggle for control of
the Executive Committee.  Eventually Gary won out and brought independent producers to
dinners where techniques of cooperation on “fair competition” were ironed out.  After the anti-
trust suit, they were no longer permitted to establish such explicit agreements.  Independents still
followed the lead of U. S. Steel, and the decades of fierce competition between the steel
companies came to an end.122
During the years after the strike, the union nevertheless remained strong in a few districts
like New Castle, Elwood, and Wheeling.  The Mingo Junction men refused to agree to the 1901
settlement at first, and within a few years their local lodge had disbanded.  Likewise, the lodge at
the sheet bar mill in Bellaire owned by National Steel had been strong in 1901, but it too soon
fell.  The Wellsville and Chester lodges did not survive the strike, and the Benwood lodge of the
Riverside works was gone by 1908, when the union was driven from the last of the National
Tube Company’s plants.123  Despite these losses, all the independents and the three sheet and tin
plate mills of U. S. Steel were still organized.  Additionally, unlike several other districts, not a
single plant was dismantled in the Wheeling district, and, in fact, the Laughlin plant was
expanded to become one of the most modern tin plate plants in the world.124
Compared with other districts, Wheeling’s lodges had been successful until 1902.
Between 1891 and 1902, the number of lodges in the Pittsburgh district dropped from 94 to 30,
and the Youngstown district had dropped from 53 to 41.  The number of lodges in Wheeling
increased from 18 in 1891 to 19 in 1902.125  Still, the Wheeling district felt the losses between
1902 and 1908, as the number of lodges dropped from 18 to about 6, but this was still better than
most of the districts around the country as the open shop movement spread.
While the Wheeling district remained relatively unionized, morale in the district did not
remain uniformly high.  Early in 1909, union men complained that there were too many who did
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not take enough interest in their organization “by not attending meetings of the lodge that helps
make their scale and conditions in the mill which many receive and enjoy,” according to one in
Martins Ferry.  Furthermore, he complained that too many were delinquent in their dues:  “The
man who does not pay his part of the expenses ought to be ashamed of himself, and quit the job
and let some fellow have the job that is willing to help pay.”126  “Some get sore because they get
dropped from membership for not paying their dues,” he wrote from Martins Ferry.  “Now I’d
like these same people that are dropped [to] tell us how we are going to carry on the business
without money.”127  Still, the 1909 open shop announcement came as a great shock to them
because their lodges had survived the worst assault.
Chapter Three: The 1909-1910 Strike
The open shop announcement came on June 1, 1909, just a month after the convention of
the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers.  There was no hint of trouble at
the convention, and the union drafted a wage scale with few changes from the year before.
Emerging from the 1907 economic downturn, workers and management alike were relieved to
have abundant orders, and the mills were running at full capacity with a few exceptions.
Wheeling’s business community concurred saying that it was “especially gratifying that the
complete recovery of the iron and steel trade which now seems to be so near at hand is not likely
to be interfered with or delayed by any possible labor difficulties.”1  As there had been little
change in labor relations for a few years, it did not seem as though there would be any in 1909,
but the announcement changed everything.2
It is unclear why U. S. Steel chose this time to force the last of its union plants to work on
an open shop basis.  Perhaps the decision was a response to the increased competition the sheet
and tin plate division had faced during the previous few years..  When U. S. Steel was formed in
1901, it controlled the vast majority of the country’s sheet and tin plate capacity, but competition
had been increasing ever since.3 This was probably because it only required about $500,000 to
start such a finishing plant whereas a company needed $20,000,000 to build a competitive basic
steel mill.4  It is just as likely, however, that U. S. Steel merely did not want to have to deal with
the restrictions and complications that came with a union workforce.
The reactions to the open shop announcement were predictable.  Wheeling’s business
community hoped the workers would acquiesce and continue to work warning that if they did not
the company would fill orders from other plants where the open shop was in effect.5  Throughout
the strike, the Wheeling Intelligencer continued to express the hope that the mills would resume
regardless of who won the strike, and to remind strikers that their struggle was futile.6  Elbert H.
Gary, chairman of the Executive Committee of U. S. Steel, announced on June 4 that the
“management of the American Sheet & Tin Plate Company has discovered it has been
discriminated against and in other ways unfairly treated by the Amalgamated Association.  The
management also discovered beyond question that a very decided majority of the men prefer to
have all mills operated on an open shop basis.”7  Meanwhile the union argued that “to accept the
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corporation’s mandate is to become its slaves, to be hounded by the corporation’s merciless
managers that they may make records for themselves.”8
On June 7, the advisory board of the union met in Pittsburgh.  Vice-presidents Walter
Larkins and Llewellyn Lewis, of the advisory board, lived and worked in the Wheeling district.
Lewis was the vice-president of the sheet division, and Larkins was the vice-president of the tin
division.  The advisory board decided that a meeting of all delegates should be arranged at once
and that lodge elections should be held as soon as possible to select the delegates.9  All of the
lodges held meetings to discuss the situation and elect delegates for the convention that would
decide the matter.  The delegate convention met in Pittsburgh on June 14 and decided that the
“only thing the Association could do under the present attitude of the corporation would be to
resist its non-union policy and refuse to work after June 30, 1909.”10  In Martins Ferry, closed
meetings of the Mountain City and Lewis Avon lodges were being held at the Lyric Theatre.
Treasurer John Williams addressed the two overflowing meetings, while across the river in
Wheeling, Assistant Secretary Michael Tighe talked to the men of Prosperity lodge.  Williams
spoke to the men for half an hour and then fielded questions from the audience.  One worker
claimed it to be the “best talk ever delivered to a meeting of mill men in this vicinity,” adding
that if “any brother came to that meeting with the intention of going to work, or a doubt in his
mind, it surely must have been cleared.”11  Meanwhile, company managers had been calling
workers individually into their offices and trying to intimidate them into coming to work.
Despite these efforts, the workers felt confident that “when July 1st comes around we expect to
have them lined up in one compact body; that not a man will disobey the orders of the executive
board.”12
As predicted, the union mills followed the executive board’s order.  At the time about
sixty percent of the tin division was organized.13  Many of the men at the Laughlin and Aetna-
Standard plant refused to even come to work on June 30, and the next day the plants were
completely shut down.  The local newspaper, however, claimed these two plants shut down early
due to heat.  In the rest of the tin plate division, the plants in Elwood, two plants in New Castle,
Sharon, and Wheeling were shut down on July 1.14  These were by far the largest tin plate mills
in operation, and their closure seriously hindered U. S. Steel’s tin plate business.  Other union tin
plate mills were inconsequential such as the ones at Piqua, Ohio, Connellsville, Pennsylvania,
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Baltimore, Maryland, and Gas City, Indiana.  They had been idle so long that the company
apparently did not intend to start them up anyway, and the Gas City lodges charter had even been
surrendered by this time.  Thus, the fight in tin plate was primarily in Elwood, New Castle,
Sharon, and the Wheeling district.15
Sheet steel was a different story as most of the sheet mills were non-union and had been
since the 1901 strike.  Only about thiry-five percent of that division was still unionized.16  The
plants at Leechburg, Hyde Park, Saltsburg, Canal Dover, New Philadelphia, Midland, Old
Meadow, Scottdale, McKeesport, and Wellsville, all with eleven or fewer mills, were non-union
and continued operating after the July 1 strike date.  The enormous Vandergrift works with
thirty-seven mills, more than twice that of any other plant, was also non-union and continue
running.17
The thrity-five percent of the sheet mills that had remained unionized did shut down with
the exception of the the Guernsey plant in Cambridge, Ohio.  J. A. Bowers, secretary of the
insurance department of the Amalgamated Association, said that the “condition at the Cambridge
plant is the result of the same tactics employed several years ago when the Steel Corporation by
keeping the mills idle for a considerable time, compelled men to ask for work, the Amalgamated
practically being forced to give up the mills at New Kensington, Dresden, O., and Canton, O.”
Bowers continued:  “These have been the methods employed ever since the American Sheet and
Tin Plate Company was formed.  They were used by the Apollo Iron and Steel Company in the
summer of 1893, when the plant there, after the scale had been signed, was shut down on July 24
and kept closed until October 6, when the mill was started up again and the men asked to report
to work individually.”  Bowers pointed out that George G. McMurtry was the president of the
Apollo Iron and Steel Company and later the first president of the American Sheet and Tin Plate
Company.  “Some of the present officials of the company, who were understudies of Mr.
McMurtry,” Bowers concluded, “appear to be continuing this feature of his policies.”18
For every union man that went out about one unskilled, non-union worker was affected.
The LaBelle tin plate mill, for example, employed about 500, and all came out even though only
about half were union members.  In all, about 5,000 union men were on strike out of a company
that normally employs 25,000.19  Plus the Tin Plate Workers International Protective Association
had about 3,000 members, but it was yet to be seen whether or not they would join the hot mill
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men in the strike when their contract expired.  If the Amalgamated Association could win a
victory in this contest, as the logic went, then perhaps the rest of the workers in the steel industry
in general would put their faith back in the union.  The Association’s president, P. J. McArdle,
announced that he did not “fear the outcome of the strike” and that they fully expected to win.
Secretary John Williams concurred:  “We are going to make an aggressive fight.  We have not
been given an opportunity to confer with any of the corporation officials and intend now to stick
it out until we get what we want.”20  The union knew the importance of the strike, and the
Amalgamated Journal declared that the “supreme test in the sheet and tin trades is at hand.”21
They knew that a loss would not only mean the end of the union at U. S. Steel but also that it
would bring further losses as independents followed the corporation’s lead.
Some independents had already refused to sign the Amalgamated wage scale.  An official
of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company summarized his company’s position clearly:  “We
have always signed the Amalgamated scale, ever since we have been in business, but we shall do
so no more.  The American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. has decided to get along without the
Amalgamated scales, and we must also.  The time was when the Amalgamated set the wage, but
now the Corporation is doing it.”22  Another company to refuse to sign the scale was the
independent LaBelle company that still owned the nail works in Wheeling and the blast furnaces
of the Jefferson works in Steubenville.  The workers in Steubenville had remained organized
until U. S. Steel broke with the Amalgamated Association, and the LaBelle Company refused to
sign a contract with them.  The strikers in Steubenville and the other employees of independent
companies felt that they were fighting the same battle as the employees of U. S. Steel, and the
two groups considered themselves to be one.  In fact, many union members wanted the union
leadership to call all of the Amalgamated men out on strike because they believed that since U. S.
Steel set the standards for the whole industry that there was no difference between the
corporation and the independents.23
Both U. S. Steel and the Amalgamated Association adopted aggressive strategies.  For U.
S. Steel that meant reopening mills that were on strike, and for the union that meant getting non-
union plants to join the struggle.  The American Sheet and Tin Plate Company announced that it
would start up the Monongahela plant in Pittsburgh’s South Side and the United States plant at
Demmler, both of which had been idle for some time.  The company was confident that it had
41
enough “independent” labor to find the 1,200 men required to run these two mills.24  The union
had been prohibited under all agreements after 1901 from trying to extend its organization to
other U. S. Steel plants, but the company’s open shop announcement “opened the way for a
general attack on all of its plants by Amalgamated men,” according to Secretary John Williams.
“We were held in check more or less in the past because we did not want to injure our standing
with the sheet and tin plate departments by pushing our organization in other unorganized
mills.”25  Now they hoped to organize all of U. S. Steel.
First, the union set their sites on the plants at Vandergrift and Apollo, Pennsylvania, two
tradtionally non-union plants located on the Kiskiminetas River separated by only two miles.
The Kiskiminetas Valley was also home to the sheet works at Leechburg, Hyde Park, and
Avonmore.  Vandergrift had long been considered a company town, and union leaders knew that
if organizers could get workers there to join their fight, it would be the union’s greatest
accomplishment of the union of the last twenty years.  To induce the workers there to go on
strike would not only shut down the corporation’s largest sheet mill, but it would be a powerful,
symbolic victory over the company.  It would not be easy to accomplish this, however, as the
Vandergrift workers had shown an unwillingness to join the union and had gone so far as to
support the company in the 1901 strike.26
Vice-president Llewellyn Lewis, of Martins Ferry, was chosen to be one of the organizers
to do the job.  Little is known of Llewellyn, but his brother, Thomas L. Lewis, was president of
the UMWA at the time.27   Tom was born at Locust Gap, Pennsylvania in 1865, and the Lewis
family moved to Shawnee, Ohio, shortly after it was laid out.  In 1882, Tom joined the Knights
of Labor and rose to prominence in the 1884-5 Hocking Valley miners strike when he became
very active in trade unions.  Tom moved to Bridgeport, Ohio, in 1889, was elected a delegate to
the 1890 convention, which created the UMWA out of rival organizations, and became a vice-
president of that organization in 1900.28  Llewellyn was living just up the river from Tom in
Martins Ferry at the time of the 1909-1910 strike.  He had been an organizer as early as 1903,29
was active in the OVTLA from that time as well, and had been president of the Ohio Federation
of Labor in 1908.  He obviously had a strong background in trade unions which was probably the
reason he was sent to Vandergrift at the start of the strike.
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George Evans, George Bender, and William Hilton, other union organizers, arrived at
Vandergrift July 1, when Lewis left to go to Pittsburgh to attend to union business while the
others began the work of organizing.  On Friday, July 9, Lewis returned to Vandergrift on the
train where he met A. Jenkins and Forny James, organizers from the UMWA that were going to
talk to miners in that area.  Jenkins and James invited Lewis to join them as they knew some of
the men working in the mills.  About noon, the three men arrived and began inquiring about
people working in the mill, and they were told to go to Vandergrift Heights.  They went there at
once and found the men “anxious to organize.”30
After talking to the men of the mills, the organizers were told to return at 6:30 p. m. when
they would be given a list of names.  When Bender, Hilton, Evans, and Lewis returned they
found that the men to whom they had talked earlier had been threatened with discharge and
everyone was “uneasy.”  The four organizers left the Heights to return to Vandergrift, and a mob,
led by Labanna Steele and a Mr. Dunn, both watchmen for the company, were waiting.  Lewis
later said, “I tried to point out to them that we were there for the purpose of discussing the
question of organization, when I was struck alongside the head with a broom handle in the hands
of Mr. Steele, Mr. Dunn smashing my glasses at the same time.”  The mob then descended on the
four organizers and began assaulting them.  One man struck at Hilton with a knife.  Then the
organizers were taken to the depot and put on a train “with a warning never to return.”  Thus,
their first effort was a total failure.  During their time there, they could not even rent a hall for a
meeting because property owners were afraid the American Sheet & Tin Plate Company would
make it “so unpleasant” for them that they would “be compelled to leave the community.”31
Robert Edwards, of Martins Ferry, another organizer for the Amalgamated Association,
remained in Vandergrift and began distributing circulars to the mill men.  On July 22, Jack
McIntyre, a foreman in the galvanizing department at the Vandergrift works, approached
Edwards and asked him what his business was.  McIntyre told Edwards that he “was not wanted
in that locality” and instructed him to leave town on the next train.  Edwards found himself
surrounded by company men and so he began to head toward the depot.  He slipped into the post
office for refuge, but when he came out McIntyre again told him again to get on the next train
and that if he returned to Vandergrift he would “be taken out in a box.”  Edwards went to the
neighboring town of Apollo and somehow managed to rent a vacant lot.  He scheduled to have a
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meeting on July 31, 1909, but when the lot owner found out that he intended to hold a union
meeting he asked Edwards to return the receipt and he would return his money.  The property
owner said that if he “permitted the property to be used for a labor meeting that his business
interests in the community would be ruined.”  Edwards refused and asked John Kennedy, the
Apollo chief of police, for protection during the meeting.  Kennedy agreed but told Edwards to
be “prepared for trouble.”32
On July 27, four days before the meeting in Apollo, the Vandergrift city council passed an
ordinance prohibiting the “posting or passing of handbills, circulars, samples, printed or written
matter of any kind” without the permission of the burgess.  Violators were made subject to a
maximum fine of $5 and a maximum jail term of 30 days.33  There could be little doubt that the
law was directed at the Amalgamated organizers.  It was for this reason that the meeting was held
in Apollo, where the company exerted less influence, albeit only a slight degree less.
Llewellyn Lewis presided over the meeting, and Raymond Robins of Chicago spoke.
Lewis later said that it was the first union meeting held in Apollo in fifteen years.34 There was no
trouble at the meeting, and the police chief even ejected one company man who tried to start
trouble.  After Edwards and other organizers had returned to the Parks Hotel in Apollo where
they were registered, Oscar Lindquist, the superintendent of the Vandergrift plant called on them.
He asked them what their business in town was, and when they told him they were
representatives of the union, he said they would simply have to leave.  The organizers replied that
they were “exercising their rights as American citizens as guaranteed to them by law.”
Superintendent Lindquist replied that “his word was the law;” he was “the Scottish chief in that
valley,” and “what he said must go.”  He told them they had one hour to leave town and that he
would get them out “if he had to burn the hotel down.”  Meanwhile a crowd of about 200 people
had gathered outside and stayed there until around midnight.  Then the burgess of Apollo
approached the organizers and told them he could no longer control the crowd claiming that he
had promised the crowd that he would make sure the organizers left town on the first train in the
morning.  If they did not, he said, there would be no way to “avert bloodshed.”  Thus, the
organizers left having failed to organize the men yet again.35
U. S. Steel’s control of Vandergrift was complete.  Originally it had been designed to be a
model industrial town.  The visionary behind the design, George McMurtry, had wanted to make
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a community “something better than the best,” and created one whose focal point was the Apollo
Iron and Steel Company.36  McMurtry became involved in the iron and steel industry in 1883
when he joined Jacob J. Vandergrift and seven other investors in a company called the Volta Iron
Company.  They purchased a galvanizing plant in Pittsburgh and an iron mill in Apollo, and in
1886, the company changed its name to the Apollo Iron and Steel Company.  In the spring of
1893, less than a year after the 1892 Homestead strike, McMurtry and the company, faced with a
serious decline in business, negotiated a wage reduction with the Amalgamated Association.  The
rollers at Apollo refused to abide by the new scale and walked off the job in August.  Just as J. A.
Bowers told reporters at the start of the 1909-1910 strike, McMurtry shut the works down until
October and declared that he would only accept workers who renounced their union membership.
Only three of the rollers went back to work, and McMurtry began recruiting and training workers
from the countryside and mines.  Early in 1894 with the strike still on, union members realized
that McMurtry would not tire of “trying to make rollers and heaters out of civil engineers,
railroad firemen, and farmers.”37  They left for other mills, and the Apollo works stayed non-
union.  McMurtry sought to find a solution to the gap between labor and capital hoping to avoid
such unpleasant struggles in the future.38
For McMurtry, the solution was the model town.  He visited European model industrial
towns like the Krupp estates near Essen, Germany, and brought the ideas back to Apollo.
Andrew Carnegie had done something similar when he laid out the town of Munhall offering
low-interest home loans through the company after the Homestead strike.  Like Carnegie,
McMurtry knew that home ownership tied the worker to the community and made him less likely
to risk his employment there.  McMurtry went a step further, having the idea that good housing
and a good living environment would make good people, which, in turn, would make good
workers.  He purchased a 640 acre farm one mile down river from Apollo on which to build the
town of Vandergrift.  He hired the well-known Boston landscape firm of Frederick Law Olmsted,
Sr. to design the town, and construction of the immense sheet steel plant began there in 1896.
McMurtry, J. J. Vandergrift, and several other investors formed the Vandergrift Land and
Improvement Company (VL&IC) and designed lots to be affordable while still targeting the
highly skilled (and highly paid) workers that would work in the sheet mill.  Additionally, workers
who had been loyal to the company were given the first opportunity to buy the lots.  Their plan
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came to fruition when a large percentage of the skilled workers bought lots and became home
owners.  The VL&IC used the same scheme when they purchased Vandergrift Heights, and again
workers purchased lots and began building homes.  A third neighborhood called Morning Sun
became the home of the Eastern and Southern Europeans that worked in the mill  Being unskilled
and low paid, they mostly rented.  McMurtry’s plan to promote home ownership among the
workers had a profound effect on the labor struggles that were to take place in the coming
years.39
By 1897, the new, integrated Vandergrift plant was producing 70,000 gross tons of
ingots, 96,000 gross tons of sheet bars, 38,000 tons of black sheets, and 51,000 tons of
galvanized sheets.40  The Apollo Iron and Steel Company sold the old mill in Apollo to the
American Tin Plate Company early in 1899, and, shortly thereafter, sold the new “state-of-the-
art” steel works to the American Sheet Steel Company.  McMurtry gained a considerable
reputation among the businessmen of the industry because the Vandergrift works produced one-
fifth of all U. S. sheet steel.  This stature helped him become the first president of the American
Sheet Steel Company and, later, the first president of the American Sheet and Tin Plate
Company.41  From this vantage point he watched his vision of close ties developing between
labor and capital come to fruition.
McMurtry’s representative, Pursifor Smith, managed the negotiations with T. J. Shaffer
that resulted in the 1901 strike.  The union leaders set their sights on Vandergrift in 1901, much
as they would eight years later, because of its size and reputation as a non-union stronghold.
Before they could begin organizing, a standing room only meeting of company supporters was
held, and one worker after another as well as many local businessmen professed their loyalty to
the company.  One speaker at the meeting took pride in the fact that they had “an entire moral
and modern industrial town, to which hundreds are journeying every year in search of steady
employment and good wages,” and said that he had “never received better treatment
anywhere.”42  Thus, McMurtry had instilled a sense of loyalty to the company among at least
some of the workers.  Others, even though they did not say so publicly, had more practical
concerns.  One anonymous writer to the Amalgamated Journal charged that those “poor fellows
are so bound up by their property investments that they are afraid to make a move publicly in
favor of organization, but the union sentiment is gaining ground even in Godforsaken
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Vandergrift, and those poor slaves will yet be prevailed upon to make an attempt to remove the
shackles which bind and make them to all intents and purposes greater slaves than were the
colored men of the south before the war.”43  Another anonymous writer said that the company
had the “spy system” and had “worked up the spirit of distrust among the men to an extent that
scarcely seems possible to one not acquainted in this town.”  He insisted that they had nothing to
lose if they all came out but that anything less would allow the company to continue.  If that
happened, all that left work would lose not only their job but also their house if they had a
mortgage.44
Either because of a feeling of loyalty to the company or out of fear of discharge the
workers at Vandergrift did not quit work for a single day during the 1901 strike.  In fact,
McMurtry began moving skilled workers to Hyde Park and Wellsville to train strikebreakers.45
After the strike failed, the industry publication Iron Age proclaimed McMurtry’s vision a
success:  “His creation of a model industrial town, peopled by men untrammeled by affiliations
with labor union, has, however, now brought to him the crowning vindication.  His men have
stood by him, and the principle of frank and cordial relations between employer and
employed.”46  The other executives at U. S. Steel were so impressed that they tried to replicate
the Vandergrift model at Gary, Indiana, around the enormous plant they built there in 1906.47
Therefore, organizers sent to Vandergrift in 1909 had more to contend with than local
ordinances and a few company bulls.  McMurtry’s scheme had created a whole environment
hostile to unions.  The loyal workers were more than willing to gather into an angry mob and
oust the organizers.  Despite this, Llewellyn Lewis remained optimistic claiming to have a plan
by which they would “secure better treatment in the towns and cities where we are trying to
organize the non-union men.”48  He enlisted about 150 men from Martins Ferry and planned for
them to parade through the streets of Vandergrift on Labor Day.  With such a large group,
company officials could no longer claim a few outside agitators were trying to disturb the
harmony of the people.49  Burgess James Chambers refused to allow such an event to take place
and, on August 31, issued a proclamation stating that the people of Vandergrift “deplore”
anything that would “mar the peace and harmony” of the town.  Since “outside influences seem
to be at work,” he outlawed parades, marches, meetings, and the “assembling of persons in large
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crowds upon the streets, alleys, highways, or private properties.”  This, he believed, would
prevent the non-residents from engendering “ill feeling among our citizens and neighbors.”50
One reporter noted that Labor Day in Western Pennsylvania presented  a “unique and
grim anomaly.”  About 5,000 steelworkers plus 5,000 glass workers and 18,000 miners were
either out on strike or locked out “making the day set apart for the working man, one to be
remembered in labor circles for years to come.”  To add further irony, he observed that Chambers
had “issued a proclamation to the effect that Labor day cannot be celebrated in his domain
tomorrow.”51  The Intelligencer predicted that the “proclamation, although against the
constitution of the United States, will be enforced in Vandergrift, as the mayor is backed by an
element that does not recognize Labor day as a national holiday.”  Either wanting to avoid a riot
or incarceration, the parade of the Martins Ferry men set to go through Vandergrift was
postponed indefinitely.52
Meanwhile, on the other side of the struggle, U. S. Steel was trying to reopen its mills.
As skilled men were required, executives had to look to the existing labor pool, most of whom
were on strike.  They hired agents to go to the various mill towns to try to induce skilled men
away from the picket lines to go to places like Elwood, Indiana, to live in the plant and roll sheet
steel and tin plate for daily wages.  Such agents would, of course, incur some risk as tensions
were high and the strikers constantly on the lookout for trouble from the company.  Thus, it took
a “special breed” to walk into a town and offer to take men away from the union.  These agents
were usually men that sought out trouble and were themselves troublemakers.53   On July 9, only
eight days after the strike had begun, one such agent, William D. Eagan, arrived in Wheeling and
began the work of hiring mill men.
Eagan lived in New Castle, but was hired in Pittsburgh at the Frick Building on July 8.
The American Sheet and Tin Plate Company employed him, he said, to “assist in getting men to
work in their plants and go and obey their orders, wherever they sent them.”54  In his words, he
had “rolled from coast to coast,” was a police officer at one time, and even played baseball.55  He
had lived in Wheeling for three years and Benwood for one, but originally he was from
Kentucky.  Eagan had been arrested a few times.  He had a “checkered past” and was willing to
admit it.56  When asked about one questionable incident in his past he responded:  “All men are
guilty, but they don’t all get caught.”57
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Eagan later claimed that as soon as he got off the train he was followed by a man named
“Sugar” Wiedman.58  The next morning he went to see James Medill, superintendent of the
LaBelle plant, and as soon as they left the plant a crowd of people that surrounded them.  They
had a constable with them who arrested Eagan for possession of a gun, which had been recently
outlawed by West Virginia’s Johnson Pistol Toting law.59  The crowd followed Eagan who was
taken down to Justice of the Peace Engel.  Frank Bowman, one of the local strike leaders, was
there to argue the case against Eagan, and asked Engel for time to bring one of the witnesses to
the office.  Engel rescheduled the trial for about 6:00 p.m. that night.  The men dispersed to the
bars where a great deal of excitement arose surrounding the case.  The strikers made such boasts
as “We’ve got that big bastard now,” and “We’ll get Bad Bill tonight.”  When the hour for the
trial came, a large crowd had gathered to watch.
Squire Engel fined Eagan, and Superintendent Medill paid the fine.  When Eagan got out
on the street, a crowd of about 200 people was waiting.  It was not just a crowd of strikers, but
included townspeople and mill workers from the independent Whitaker-Glessner plant.  As
Eagan began to walk up the street, several men quickly converged on him.  Someone tripped
Eagan, and the mob began to beat him.  One man opened up a gash on Eagan’s face with a pair
of brass knuckles while another man tore a paling off a picket fence and began beating him with
it.  Eventually Eagan was able to make it to his feet and ran into a house.  A woman, there with
her children, agreed to let Eagan wash his face in the kitchen while the angry mob waited outside.
After a short time, a paddy wagon arrived at the woman’s house to take Eagan to a safe
place.  That safe place turned out to be the city jail where Eagan spent three days without being
charged with any crime other than carrying a pistol for which he had already been fined.  When
he was released, Eagan met his wife and son at the depot, and he went straight to a hospital in
Pittsburgh’s South Side.  Rumors began to circulate that he was dead, but, as it turned out, after
he spent a few days in the hospital he had recovered sufficiently to sign an affidavit that had been
prepared for him by a company lawyer.60  It outlined the events of the evening of July 10 and was
submitted to U. S. District Court Judge Alston G. Dayton.  Dayton, after reading the affidavits of
Eagan, Medill, and several others, issued an injunction against the strikers on July 21.  The
injunction forbade several specific strikers named by the superintendent in his affidavit,
including Frank Bowman, as well as their “associates and confederates” from “interfering in any
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manner whatsoever with the employees” of the American Sheet and Tin Plate Company and with
its property.  It also prohibited the placing of pickets or watchmen near the LaBelle works and
included a myriad of other stipulations.61
Injunctions had become a convenient way for companies to legitimize the use of force to
protect their property and the non-union workers they brought in to restart the mills.  Dayton
became infamous for granting injunctions that were damaging to labor’s ability to conduct strikes
and picket mills and mines.  He had issued an injunction against striking electrical linemen in
1907 preventing them from distributing circulars that publicized their strike and called for a
boycott.  Later, he issued another one against miners striking against the Colliers Mine in Brooke
County in 1913 and 1914 prohibiting them from interfering with the mine in any way.  The latter
injunction led the Wheeling Majority, the local labor newspaper, to insist that the “people need a
judge who will be moved by their suffering, whose eyes are not shut to injustices that beat upon
them, whose ears will not be closed to their cries of pain.”62  An investigation of Dayton’s
questionable actions against labor between 1907 and 1913 began in early 1914.  In March 1914,
the Judiciary Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives began hearings into Dayton’s
judicial behavior, and when the findings were published a year later the committee found Dayton
guilty of “bad taste” and a poor standard of ethics but not guilty of an impeachable offense.63
After Dayton issued the injunction against the LaBelle workers the Amalgamated Journal
denounced it as hypocrisy:  “The American Sheet and Tin Plate Company asks and receives
federal and state aid in the form of federal injunctions on the mere supposition that their property
is in danger; and yet its managers and hirelings are allowed unmolested to lead mobs against
men, simply because in a lawful way they appeal to their workmen to join the movement now on
to oppose the establishment of the ‘OPEN SHOP’ (NON-UNION) policy in all its mills.”64
There was a growing feeling that courts had usurped power through the use of injunctions that
they were not intended to have.  Even the rather conservative Wheeling Intelligencer applauded
an Elwood judge for refusing to grant the company an injunction against the employees there
saying that “except in extreme cases in which federal interests are involved, the federal courts
should not interfere in local difficulties.”  The editor was not entirely sympathetic to the strikers’
cause adding that the responsibility for the protection of property “rests properly upon the
states.”65 A trial was held the next April to determine if the injunction against the LaBelle
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strikers should be made permanent, but A. G. Dayton reserved his judgment “until a future
date.”66  No future action seems to have been taken in regards to the injunction.
After Eagan was beaten on July 10, West Virginia Governor William E. Glasscock read
in the Pittsburgh Dispatch that there had been “some trouble” in Wheeling and wrote to
Commissioner I. V. Barton to find out if it was serious.67  Barton replied that there were “no
disturbances” among the strikers and that U. S. Steel was making no attempt to bring non-union
workers in to restart the mill.  He told the governor not to pay attention to the newspaper
accounts as they were misleading.  Barton reassured the governor that he had been in the strike
district continuously and that he was giving it all of his attention.  In conclusion he said:
“Everything in the industrial world is progressing nicely.”68
Eagan was not the only such agent for the company nor was he the only one mobbed by
angry mill workers.  On July 29, two men were beaten in Clarksburg for trying to induce men
away from the Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Company, an independent company.69  Charles H.
Patterson went to Clarksburg offering $10 a day to rollers to come to work at the Shenango plant
in New Castle.  Two employees of the Phillips company talked to him to find out as much as they
could.  He offered them permanent jobs and told them that the trust would put all the
independents out of business soon.  They should, he advised them, “come in out of the rain”
before their company goes out of business.  Then they would be in good standing with the trust
and would probably get promotions as they expanded their operations in Gary, Indiana.  The
agent also assured them protection as he weighed nearly three hundred pounds and was “not
afraid of a thousand men.”  The two men left him and later saw him being chased by a crowd of
fifty to seventy men.70
July 15, 1909, marked the end of the Tin Plate Workers International Protective
Association’s contract, and they too came out on strike.  The locations most affected were
Chester, West Virginia, New Kensington, Pennsylvania, and the United States plant in Demmler.
These were the plants where the Amalgamated Associations did not have lodges.  Thus, without
tin house workers the operations in those plants were ‘crippled.’71  It is likely that the other tin
houses where the Amalgamated men were out would have been shut down after the supply of
rolled sheet and plate was exhausted anyway, but at Chester and New Kensington, only the tin
house workers were organized.  Thus, two plants that would have been untouched by the strike
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were it not for the TPWIPA lodges.  The exodus of the tin house workers reaped some benefits
for the Amalgamated Association.  J. A. Bowers, the Insurance Secretary, held a meeting in New
Kensington on July 17 with 400 in attendance.  The hot mill men voted to form a new lodge, and
it was named “Conqueror.”  This was the first time since 1901 that the Amalgamated had drawn
non-union workers from an open shop.72
The superintendent of the Chester works, George D. Evans, said he did not believe there
would be a problem replacing the workers and that the company only “sought to control its own
business.”73  The mayor swore in four new deputies to help maintain order though the strikers
there assured reporters they would only use moral persuasion to try to convince those that
remained working to leave their posts.74  On July 19, two carloads of about sixty men arrived
from Pittsburgh to keep the mill running, which they were able to do for the most part.  Evans
said he was “well satisfied with the present situation.”75
In all, about 3,000 tin house workers, a third of whom were women, went on strike
affecting, in addition to Chester, New Kensington, and Demmler, both the Shenango and Greer
plants in New Castle, plants in Elwood, Sharon, and the three plants in the Wheeling district.
The New Castle tin houses were evidently not organized before the strike, and formed TPWIPA
lodges when they came out.  In Sharon, forty women left the plant even though they were not
union members simply because they “would not handle the product of non-union men.”76  In all,
90 percent of the TPWIPA membership was involved in the strike.77  Their support helped
solidify the efforts of the Amalgamated Association but did not really have that great of an
impact on the strike, and the two sides remained stalemated.
In August, I. V. Barton, the Commissioner of Labor of West Virginia, and representatives
of the labor departments of Ohio and Indiana came together with the hope of finding a way to
bring the strike to an end.  They first took the matter to Seth Low, the president of the National
Civic Federation.  Low presented the matter to Elbert Gary who said that he would not interfere
as it was a matter of the American Sheet and Tin Plate Company and its current president,
Eugene W. Pargny.  Barton and the other state labor agents met with Pargny in Pittsburgh on
August 31.  Barton reported that Pargny “informed us, in a very decided way, that the company
he represented would not consider any proposition of the State Departments of Labor looking
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toward a settlement between themselves and their employees.  So our hopes were blasted; there
being no other tribunal to which we could apply.”78
It was obvious to the union that in order to induce the workers in the non-union plants to
join them that they would need help, especially since they had decided to take on the
responsibility of organizing all of U. S. Steel.  The Amalgamated Association simply did not
possess the wherewithal to reach the hundreds of thousands of steelworkers across the county.79
On June 18, 1909, before the strike, shortly after the advisory board of the Association met in
Pittsburgh, President P. J. McArdle met with Samuel Gompers.  McArdle told Gompers that his
union simply could not yield to the open shop order and that, while he realized the AFL could not
provide much financial support at that time, he was hoping that Gompers could lend him the
services of a number of the AFL organizers.  Gompers told McArdle that “it would be the desire
of the A. F. of L. to help him with organizers to the fullest extent of our ability.”  Gompers wrote
to AFL Secretary Frank Morrison that this strike might “be the turn of the tide” and “the men of
that industry may again take their position in the front rank of the organized labor movement.”80
McArdle and Secretary Williams sent a letter to a variety of different unions addressed to
“ALL MEMBERS OF ORGANIZED LABOR” asking for assistance to combat U. S. Steel’s
“war of extermination” against the Association.  They explained that their limited resources were
making it difficult to carry on their organization work and that they did not hesitate to ask for
financial support knowing that the contest meant so much to organized labor everywhere.81
Unions and labor organizations all over the country supported the Association generously.
Locally, the OVTLA and Belmont Trades and Labor Assembly donated money to their cause, as
did steelworkers from local independent companies.  The lodge at Follansbee, West Virginia sent
$500 to the national office “to be used to help the strikers who are in need of the necessaries of
life in the tin mill strike at New Castle, Martins Ferry, Wheeling and Elwood.”82  By October, the
secretary reported that the union was financially stronger than it had been before the strike and
able to assist “every needy person.”83
Meanwhile, AFL organizers were meeting with as little success as the Amalgamated
organizers had.  Emmett Flood, a general organizer for the AFL, went to Morgantown, West
Virginia, to try to organize the workers at the small Sabraton plant but was run out of town by
George Grubb, the chief of police, and Al Layton, the mayor.  AFL Secretary Frank Morrison,
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who became the chief official spokesman while Gompers was in Europe, announced publicly that
Flood “had a perfect right to be there,” but Grubb, claiming to be carrying out specific orders of
the mayor, told Flood to leave town or the mayor would not be responsible for what happened.
Morrison said that he would be sending Flood back to Morgantown “to exercise his rights of free
locomotion and free speech and to insist that the officials of Morgantown give to him the
protection that any other citizen of the United States is entitled to.”84 The mayor denied that he
had any involvement in Flood’s ejection or the denial of any of the organizers’ constitutional
rights.  When Flood  returned to Morgantown, he found out that Tom O. Jones, one of three
Amalgamated organizers there, had been knocked down on the street by a complete stranger and
that the atmosphere had not changed much since his previous visit. The union was unable to get
any of the workers to leave the Sabraton mill.85
At the beginning of August, both Charles Lawyer, president of the TPWIPA, and P. J.
McArdle wrote to Frank Morrison requesting permission to call a meeting of the heads of the
various major unions to, in Lawyer’s words, work out “a general policy for all the organizations
to pursue to combat the open shop movement.”86  Morrison sent a letter inviting the various labor
leaders to a meeting in Pittsburgh.  Several of the leaders gathered in early October 1909, but
John B. Lennon of the Journeymen Tailors Union of America refused to attend protesting that he
was “unalterably opposed first last and all the time to these conferences of officials who go
without direct sanction from their union.”  He explained that too often “their judgment is
swamped by their sympathy with the people who are engaged in the struggle and declarations are
made which cannot possibly be fulfilled, the expectations of the people involved are raised by the
declarations made and when there is no realization they get sulky and drop away and go back to
work.”87  Others, like Francis Feehan and Van Bittner of the UMWA, and representatives and
organizers from a few other unions did meet with P. J. McArdle on October 3.  They made plans
to meet in Harrisburg on December 9 to discuss how to combat the oppression of the
Pennsylvania state constabulary in light of the conflict in New Castle and another strike taking
place in McKees Rocks.88
In October 1909, P. J. McArdle issued a circular outlining a broad based organizing drive
beginning “with the blast furnace industry and running through all departments of the steel
industry including tube, structural, rail, bar, and other departments.”  The cause of the poor
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working conditions of the steel workers, McArdle explained, was the lack of organization.
“Believing that the men of the steel and iron industry realize the crying need for such an
organization,” the union, McArdle continued, extends an invitation to the men in all the
departments of the mills to “join in the work of cementing all the workers of this great industry
into a powerful organization for their mutual protection and welfare.”  He concluded by urging
the men to “forget that you are English, Irish, Welsh, Slavish, Polish, German, Croatian, Italian,
or Hungarian.  Remember always that you are a working man with interests in common with, and
inseparable from those of all other workingmen.”89
The national AFL convention opened in Toronto, Canada on November 8, 1909.  P. J.
McArdle brought a resolution from the Amalgamated Association that asked the delegates to
recognize that the United States Steel Corporation was “the most formidable and aggressive
enemy” the labor movement faced, and that “we believe the thorough organization of all
branches of its business is the most important and necessary work that could engage the
attention, time and effort of the American Federation of Labor” and its affiliates.90  McArdle also
proposed a second resolution that all organizations affiliated with the AFL pay twenty-five cents
per member annually to create a National Defense Fund, “to be used to help any organization
engaged in a strike or lockout, when their funds are depleted.”91  The convention adopted his first
resolution, and in accordance to the resolution a meeting was scheduled to be held in the
Monongahela Hotel in Pittsburgh on December 13, 1909.92  Finally, the convention
acknowledged the “great odds” against the AAISTW and the TPWIPA and expressed the hope
“that every wage-worker employed in those industries may be thoroughly organized in the unions
where they properly belong, their wages increased and their conditions of employment
improved.”93
The meeting at the Monongahela Hotel brought together about two hundred delegates of
various unions.  They planned to discuss a great variety of issues including the strike of
switchmen in the Northwest, the strike of the handmade glass blowers in the middle states, but of
central concern was the strike against U. S. Steel.  Samuel Gompers presided over the meeting
and assured reporters that it would be “prolific of great results.”94  Rumors of great and radical
changes in the labor movement were circulating in Wheeling.  One such rumor claimed that the
Amalgamated Association would call the strike off so that steelworkers could “start anew” and
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reorganize “on a broad basis.”95  It was truly a meeting of “great labor leaders who have won
great strikes,” brought there for the purpose of plotting a course to organize the United States
Steel Corporation.  George W. Perkins of the cigar makers, John Hays, secretary of the
International Typographical Union, James O’Connell, president of the machinists association,
Tom L. Lewis, president of the UMWA, and Frank M. Ryan, president of the structural iron
workers, were all in attendance, not to mention the leaders of the AFL.96
It is highly possible that such a radical reorganization was discussed, but what came out
of the meeting was a resolution replete with radical rhetoric, vilification of the corporation, but
not radical change.  “Grown rich and powerful by the consent and good will of the people or our
country,” the resolution text read, “this corporation in its mad greed and lust for still greater
riches and power sweeps aside, makes and unmakes law, its enactors and executors, and is now
engaged in an effort to destroy the only factor - the organizations of its employees - standing
between it and unlimited, unchecked and unbridled industrial, political, social and moral
carnage.”  They criticized U. S. Steel and corporations in general because “while centralizing its
powers, it proposes to individualize its employees.  It arrogates to itself the right of combination,
but denies this right to its workers.”  They resolved that the AAISTW and TPWIPA should
combine and that “an earnest and systematic effort be made to thoroughly and completely
organize all employees in the iron, steel and tin plate industry and subsidiary co-related trades.”
Finally, they asked all the national unions to send at least one organizer to execute the plan.97
There were rumors the day after the meeting at the Monogahela Hotel ended that organization
efforts were already beginning at the Bellaire basic steel plant, which had been non-union for
years.98
Walter Larkins, of Martins Ferry, outlined the AFL plan for local reporters which was to
go into effect on the first day of 1910.  He said they hoped to have up to forty organizers in the
field attacking all departments of U. S. Steel by early January.  In addition, they would levy all
union members ten cents which, hopefully, would bring in $250,000 to help support the strikers
and pay for organizers, and lastly, a committee from the AFL would meet with President Howard
Taft and the governors of the states involved to demand an investigation of the “methods
employed by the corporation and the conditions in their plants.”99
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 “From a purely local standpoint, possibly, it is well that the Federation has taken up this
matter,” the Wheeling Intelligencer assured. “The fight against the steel corporation will not be
confined to a few local plants like those in Wheeling and Martins Ferry.  This, therefore, will not
be the sole battle ground.  Other communities are pretty likely to be involved, which will at least
demonstrate that there are communities besides our own in which the policy of the steel
corporation is not looked upon with favor by the workingman.”  Again the newspaper expressed
the hope that the issue would be settled quickly “for all time” because the public “suffers from
the frequent labor disputes without the ability to correct or hinder them.”100  What the editor was
really expressing was the fear that U. S. Steel would remove the plants and the equipment to
other cities where labor was more compliant.  This fear was not the invention of the newsman but
had been promoted by the company.
At one point during the strike, the district manager of the American Sheet and Tin Plate
Company called the leading businessmen of Wheeling together for an informal meeting.  At the
meeting the manager read a letter from the President Pargny that said that the company was
withholding $200,000 that had been set aside for improvements to the LaBelle plant but that now
he could not say that it would ever be spent.  He claimed that a high ranking official of U. S.
Steel had remarked that “unless our operations in that locality could be carried on with less
trouble incident to labor, and more cooperation on the part of the community, the natural
outcome would be the boarding up of the plants . . . and moving them elsewhere.”  It was later
rumored that the equipment in local plants was designated to go to Gary, Indiana, but this never
happened.101  In December, 1909, the Wheeling Intelligencer reported that the Aetna-Standard
was already being dismantled, and the equipment was being removed to Gary.102  This also
proved to be untrue, but the effect on the businessmen, however, was very real.  Businessmen in
New Castle expressed hopes that the Wheeling plants would be dismantled and the equipment
moved to their city.103
G. O. Smith, a leading real estate agent in Wheeling, expressed what was probably the
typical belief of the local business community.  “Wheeling has been handicapped in many
different ways,” he told the Wheeling Intelligencer.  The “difference between capital and labor
has probably kept Wheeling back twenty years” and so has “the inefficiency of our city
government in caring for the city’s business.”104  After the strike, businessmen in Wheeling
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formed the Municipal Improvement League.  Different organizations had already formed in
Wheeling that ostensibly sought to boost industry and commerce, but also harbored very negative
views of labor.  In 1911, OVTLA singled these organizations out as a threat separate from U. S.
Steel concluding that “the situation in Wheeling is not as bright now as for the future, unless
organized labor will rally together to meet its foes: with conditions as above stated we have to
battle the Board of Trade, the Business Association, and to top it off yet they have formed a
Municipal Improvement League, its purpose no doubt which you are familiar with.”105
Whether or not the atmosphere in Wheeling was growing more hostile to labor, as the
OVTLA argued, was a matter of debate.  The Wheeling Board of Trade, for example, formed in
1900 and brought together many prominent businessmen in the area for luncheons and dinners to
hear speeches.106  They also organized such events as a contest in August, 1909, to decided what
the city slogan should be, ultimatley deciding on “Wheeling Means Business.”107  Roy Benton
Naylor, the secretary of the Board of Trade, said that the Board had “been a factor in our civic
advance, standing not only for things commercial and industrial but also promoting many
municipal improvements, which in the last analysis mean better business and more prosperity for
all.”  The Board organized the Playground Association, which funded the construction of
playgrounds in different places in the city promoted the “beautification” of the city in general.
The Board also organized the Associated Charities “backing the bond issue and assessment
plan,” and formed the Market-Auditorium Company which raised $150,000 to build an
auditorium.  The auditorium would seat about 4,000 people and, it was hoped, would attract big
conventions.  Naylor concluded that Wheeling was developing from a “typical oldtime
manufacturing town” whose “sole object” was to make money into a “community with the higher
civic aims which follow a realizing sense that good government, municipal improvements,
playgrounds, organized charities and other things along these lines” ultimately pay financial
dividends as well.108  The Ohio Valley Trades and Labor Assembly obviously had a very
different view of these organizations, and charged the Municipal Improvement League, which
was ostensibly intended to make the city government more efficient, with “slavish submission to
the will of the giant steel trust looking toward the wiping out of the influence of labor in the
entire Wheeling district.”109
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After the strike, the OVTLA was aghast when Tom L. Lewis, now the former president of
the UMWA and head of a coal operators association, spoke in favor of the Municipal
Improvement League.  Lewis allegedly told one member of the OVTLA that “it would be better
if the mills were allowed to run here,” implying that if a change in city government were
necessary, so be it.  J. B. O’Toole, a delegate of the OVTLA said that he considered Lewis to be
“a Benedict Arnold to the Labor movement.”  The Wheeling Majority likened the Municipal
Improvement League to the National Civic Federation (NCF).  Workers believed that the NCF,
presided over by John Mitchell, another former UMWA president, was an organization that only
gave the high officers of national unions an opportunity to betray the workers.  The president of
the OVTLA argued that if they let the Municipal Improvement League and the business
associations “have their way” that the conditions in Wheeling would eventually become similar
to other parts of West Virginia, where a coal miner told him that he worked for a whole year and
“did not draw during that time one red penny.”110
On December 1, 1909, in an attempt to resume operations at the Aetna-Standard plant in
Aetnaville, the American Sheet and Tin Plate Company started up four mills.  Though several
pickets were in the vicinity of the plant at 8 a.m. when the furnaces were lit there was no
disorder, but when the workers came out after the first shift, a crowd of about 200 were there to
protest the men working under the open shop.  While there were rumors of trouble, the Wheeling
Register only reported that “several warm arguments” were alleged to have taken place.  On
December 2, there were even more rumors, and one worker told the mayor of Martins Ferry that
shots had been fired.  That night about 700 people gathered around the plant.  When the
southbound Cleveland and Pittsburgh passenger train pulled into town, the non-union workers
boarded it, and as the train pulled away three or four shots were fired at it.  That night, seven
company guards got off another train and found themselves right near the strikers’ headquarters
on Crawford Street.  Tensions were high, and violence erupted.  By December 4, four men had
been wounded during the intermittent gun battles, three company guards and one striker.111
Llewellyn Lewis charged the company guards with starting the trouble in every instance
of the previous few days.  The workmen, he said, were law-abiding and intelligent.  They would
not use anything but lawful methods in their just fight.  “The whole question,” he reiterated for
the press, “is the issue of a trade agreement and the refusal of the company to grant us a
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conference.  We worked under the agreement since 1901, and were proud of our relations with
each other.  It evidently is the aim of the company to crush the Amalgamated Association.”  On
December 4, Joseph Bishop, former president of the Amalgamated Association and the current
secretary of the Ohio state board of arbitration arrived in Martins Ferry with hopes of bringing
order to the situation.  Bishop’s father had been an ironworker at Wheeling’s Top Mill, and
Bishop told a reporter from the Intelligencer, “I was only a small boy when we moved from
Wheeling to Pittsburgh, but I still remember many of the places and incidents that occurred when
we lived here.”112  He met with Lewis and some company officials, but nothing came out of
those meetings.  That morning, the Belmont County sheriff wired Ohio Governor Judson L.
Harmon describing the three days of shooting incidents including one during which strikers shot
at an ambulance that came to attend to wounded guards.  “Have made every effort to cope with
situation and have exhausted my power,” he wrote.  “Mob well armed.  Have satisfactory proof
that previous preparations were made by mob.  Leader said they were looking for another
Homestead and were prepared for it.  Mob now numbers over 700.  Many rioters from West
Virginia state.  Absolutely necessary that 1,000 troops be sent at once.”113
On Sunday, December 5, as the sheriff had requested, 1,000 soldiers from the Ohio
National Guard arrived in Martins Ferry.  The Register reported that the “presence of soldiers
with machine guns trained on all avenues leading to the plant and soldiers on all sides had the
effect of dispelling all signs of disorder and resistance that marked the situation on the Ohio side
from Wednesday until Sunday.”  The soldiers were said to have been surprised to find the
situation quiet and orderly as the reports they had been given led them to believe quite the
opposite.  Pickets were prevented from coming within 1,000 yards of the Aetna-Standard, and
there were no further incidents.  Ultimately the company’s efforts were in vain as the men who
worked the four mills on December 1 and 2 did not return to work.  On December 7, as there was
little for soldiers to do other than patronize local stores and barbers, half the force was sent
home.114  By December 16, all the troops had left and had even donated the remainder of their
rations to the strikers before doing so.  District Manager Cecil Robinson was reportedly
instructed to close the plant down again and send the guards away.115
In the aftermath of the incident, the Wheeling Majority declared it a victory for labor:
“SO FAR AS THE WHEELING DISTRICT IS CONCERNED THE TRUST HAS BEEN
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ABSOLUTELY WHIPPED!”116  Twenty-four indictments were handed down by a Belmont
County grand jury, but the Majority complained that there were no indictments “against any
Trust thug.”  Of the twenty-four indictments, eight were for felonies.  Both Llewellyn Lewis and
Walter Larkins of the Amalgamated Association received indictments for felonies.117  Lewis was
indicted on two counts of shooting with intent to kill or wound.118 An editorial in the Wheeling
Intelligencer demanded justice:  “Law is made for all men.  The laws that penalize murderous
assault and destruction of property cannot be suspended for the benefit of any particular class.  It
is the duty of the Belmont County officials to bring the men who encouraged and took part in
these riotous demonstrations to justice.”  Yet again the editor concluded that there was no point
in continuing the strike and that “even the most reckless and rash of their leaders must by this
time be convinced of the utter futility of their efforts.”119
The jury for the trials was selected in May 1910.  Of the twelve jurors, seven were
farmers, two were retired, one was a hardware dealer, one a barber, and one an express driver.120
On May 6, eleven of the strikers, those charged with assault and battery and rioting, were
acquitted,121 and on May 13, David Jenkins, who had been indicted for shooting at the passenger
train on December 2, was also acquitted.122
Gompers made an official statement on January 1, 1910, condemning the trust for paying
dividends on watered stock, having attorneys “notoriously present” at every legislative body
where favors could be bought, controlling judges who handed down unjust injunctions,
destroying the free market in iron and steel, and controlling certain daily newspapers to spread its
propaganda.  He said that its “crowning criminality” was “its bold and heartless enserfing of
labor.”  The ten cents per member levy on all unions that the AFL now called for was to help
fight U. S. Steel policies, which by “methodically” hiring “freshly arrived immigrants,” by
substituting young men for fathers with families, by closing mills and disheartening
communities, was resulting in “the systematic destruction of the labor movement.”  For these
reasons, Gompers pleaded, “the moral support and financial assistance of all are necessary.”123
Support came from unexpected sources such as the Eight Hour Tobacco Company of Cincinnati
that sent $100 to the Amalgamated Association.124  Valentine Reuther, president of the OVTLA,
hoped that other organizations “upon whom fortune has shone more favorably will lend these
brothers not only their moral, but financial support.”125
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The AFL’s announcement that the organization was entering the battle in full buoyed the
strikers’ morale.  According to the Wheeling Majority:  “Probably half a hundred organizations
will have representatives, tried veterans in labor’s battles, enter the arena, and the striking mill
men have more reason than ever to feel their cause is not lost, as the daily papers have so often
told them.”  The newspaper also expressed hope that this signaled a new era, one of industrial
unionism.  While previously “craft unions have held forth in the steel production field, and
whichever organization lucky enough to get a scale signed, paid no attention to other employes
not so fortunate.”  Now, the “Trust finally threw down the mask, showing its open antagonism to
all organizations, and this act has forced all organizations, in self defense, to come together.
Hence the combined fight, with its magnificent lesson of working class solidarity.”126
These hopes, however, did not last long.  By all accounts, the AFL’s craft union approach
handicapped the organizing drive, and it ended without concrete results by the second week of
February, 1910.127  According to P. J. McArdle, however, including the four AFL general
organizers already working, less than ten organizers from AFL and its affiliated unions had
reported by February, and three of them devoted a considerable amount of their time to their own
organization and not to the Amalgamated Association.  This, McArdle said, “precluded the
possibility of them adapting themselves to any fixed program that we had agreed upon.”  This
pitiful effort, as McArdle pointed out, would obviously not be enough to tackle the the task of
organizing the enormous corporation.  The campaign had turned into a “huge farce” that was
damaging to the morale of the strikers and could not continue.128  Regardless of the organizers
craft union approach, there simply was not enough response for the AFL initiative to make any
difference in the strike.
In February, the Wheeling Board of Trade decided to buy the LaBelle tin plant from U. S.
Steel.  “Wheeling business men realize that their prosperity depends upon the steady operation of
industrial plants in the city and vicinity and the benefits that would accrue if this plant could be
purchased and placed in operation are obvious,” the Wheeling Intelligencer reported.129  Matt
Greer, of the Prosperity Lodge, said, “You can bet all that you are worth that the American Sheet
and Tin Plate Company won’t sell the mill to them.  It looks to me like a political bluff.”130  The
company did refuse.  One businessman who met with E. W. Pargny reported that Pargny said that
“under no circumstances would the trust sell the plant.”131  The Board began making plans to
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build its own sheet mill.132  The Wheeling Intelligencer urged the local businessmen to build the
new mill because in “Wheeling and Martins Ferry thousands of skilled workmen are idle.  Most
of the men have lived for years in this neighborhood; they have their homes and their families
here.  They will remain here if there is a decent opportunity for them to earn a living.”
Otherwise, of course, they would leave.133  The New Industries committee of the Board of Trade
scouted out locations for the new mill, discussed its profitability, petitioned for political support,
and ultimately abandoned the idea altogether.134
On March 14, 1910, one picket, Solomon Edwards was shot by a non-union worker who
lived in Martins Ferry but was working at the Steubenville LaBelle plant.  Edwards and several
pickets approached Emanuel Robinson, who drew a pistol and fired two shots at the pickets.  One
bullet struck Sol Edwards, tearing through his liver and puncturing his lung, and he was taken to
the City hospital.  The twenty-seven year old Edwards was a well-known athlete who played for
the Wheeling Tigers football team.  The doctors there were unable to save him, and he died on
March 16. The newspapers were quick to label Robinson a “Vicious Negro Scab.”  Robinson, a
bricklayer who lived in Martins Ferry, secured work at the Steubenville LaBelle plant and had
been spending his weekends with his family in Martins Ferry.135  Five thousand people attended
Edwards’s funeral, including Llewellyn Lewis, Michael Tighe, and Joseph A. Bowers.  Lewis
said during the Riverview Cemetery service that Edwards “was always a champion and defender
of the rights of his fellowmen, and could he have lived to take part in future contests his voice
would always have been heard in the defense of the principles for which he was so cruelly
slain.”136  Michael Tighe wrote to the Amalgamated Journal that “never in the history of the
Ohio Valley, was there such an outpouring of men and women to do honor to one who had
proved himself worthy of the crown of immortality.”137
It was revealed during Robinson’s trial that the pickets had attacked him, and that one had
struck him with a blackjack before he drew his pistol and fired.  As Edwards lay dying in the
hospital, he admitted to Belmont County Prosecuting Attorney that they had attacked Robinson.
At first they tried to dissuade him from working, but Robinson refused to listen.  Edwards
explained:  “This fellow is blacksheeping, you know.  He was trying to down us, anyhow.  I did
go up there for the purpose of licking him, but that was as far as it went.  He pulled a gun on me
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and shot twice.  That is all I know about it.  I had to get away.”  Robinson was acquitted on the
grounds of self-defense.
O. Bowen, or “Hugo,” a frequent writer to the Amalgamated Journal and a socialist,
raised the rhetorical question of Edwards’ death:  “Who murdered him?  The ‘scab’ was simply a
tool (consciously or unconsciously) ready to do anything to uphold the profit system.  Bro. and
Comrade Solomon Edwards was ‘A SOLDIER OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION.’”
Hugo went on to say that the “capitalistic system has made men desperate by oppression and life,
on the terms offered by the tyrants upheld by that system.”138  Others focused on Robinson’s
release as more proof that the state and the courts were against the strikers saying that the
“discharge of the scab negro that shot Sol Edwards only goes to show how little consideration the
striking working men have in the courts.  It is a sure thing that the workers must fight single
handed their battle for human rights against all combined power of capitalism and the courts.”139
By the spring of 1910 the strikers’ morale began to flag.  The American Sheet and Tin
Plate Company announced in April that the preceding month, a new record for sheet production
had been set “without operating the Aetna-Standard Works at Bridgeport, Ohio, which is capable
of producing about 12,000 tons a month,” reported Iron Age.140  While this may have been pure
propaganda aimed at the strikers, such reports were increasingly disheartening to them.  Then U.
S. Steel granted a wage increase on April 21, which put wages above the Amalgamated
Association’s scale.141  P. J. McArdle insisted that the wage increase would not hurt their cause
and that the union had not lost any ground despite the hardships that accompanied the winter
weather.  He was sure that their situation would improve as the weather got warmer.142
Truthfully, however, by the summer of 1910, support for the strike was growing scarce.
In early August, 1910, a vote was taken to decide if the strike should be continued.
Nationwide the union voted 942 to 548 to continue the strike.  But 490 votes to keep the strike on
came from the McKinley lodge in Elwood, Indiana.  The Mountain City Lodge of Martins Ferry
voted 177 to 101 to end the strike, as did the Lewis Avon Lodge of Aetnaville by a margin of 126
to 48. Sharon and New Castle also voted to end the strike, but Wheeling’s Prosperity Lodge
voted 88 to 3 to keep striking.  However, the vote reveals that less than 1,500 votes were taken
from the strike centers which shows that many of the Amalgamated men had already abandoned
the union.  The 278 votes from the Mountain City Lodge, for example, were less than half of the
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600 eligible voters.143  The men were undoubtedly working in other industries, independent sheet
and tin plates plants, or scabbing by this time.
On August 23, the executive board of the Association declared the strike at an end despite
general vote of the members in favor of continuing.  The general vote had no authority, only the
Executive Board of the convention of delegates could determine policy.144  The TPWIPA
decided to continue the strike without the AAISTW, but soon they too were forced to admit
defeat.145  P. J. McArdle and John Williams distributed a circular to the members explaining that
the strike had “reached a point where little or no hope can be entertained of reaching an amicable
settlement through an agreement with the company because of the powerful resources of the
company, and of the repeatedly expressed desire of a large number of men to have the strike
declared off.”  The New Castle and South Sharon lodges had requested the strike called off, and
the Lewis Avon lodge in Martins Ferry had passed a resolution to the same effect.  The strike
officially ended after August 27, 1910.146  After the strike, the lodges in the Wheeling district
voted to retain their charters, but the workers in New Castle were finished with the union.147
On Labor Day, 1910, a parade of three thousand men and seven brass bands made their
way through the streets of Wheeling.  Prosperity Lodge No. 3 of the Amalgamated Association,
representing the LaBelle tin plate workers, led the parade.  The men of the local lodges including
the “over-river-boys” all wore “Sol Edwards Martyr” badges.  It was probably the last public
display by the local lodges that lost their contest with U. S. Steel in the 1909-1910 strike.148
The Wheeling Intelligencer was critical of the union, as always, pointing out that they had
predicted the strikers would lose from the beginning.  One editorial argued that many of the
strikers probably had not wanted to quit work but that “the radicals and extremists lead them on,
and the result has been one of the most disastrous labor conflicts ever carried on in this
valley.”149
Wheeling had been the “center of resistance.”  Proudly the striker had kept the local
plants shut down for the entire strike, but orders were merely shifted to other locations where
plants were successfully opened with strikebreakers.150  Thus, the loss was particularly poignant
for the Wheeling steelworkers.  The Wheeling Majority summarized the sentiments of the
workers at the end of the strike:
The mills are resuming.  The men are returning to work.  Once again the rolls will rumble
and the fires will blaze.  And the men will toil through long hours at the top notch of
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physical endeavor.  They will be so exhausted after the end of the day’s work that they
will not be able to enjoy the better things of life and so they will be called stupid.  They
will be so worn out that they will take stimulants, and they will be called drinking men.
Some of them will collapse; some will contract ailments that kill, and all will shorten
their natural lives.  For all of this they will receive about a fourth of what they produce.151
The other three-fourths, the column observed, would be kept by the capitalists, some of which
“Carnegie will use to carve his name above the door of a library.”  Meanwhile, the worker will
take his one-fourth and divide that up.  He will give one-fourth of his money to the landlord and
the other three-fourths to merchants.  The merchants will give some of that to the newspapers,
and the worker’s money continues to be divided among others.  “Thus the landlords, the
merchants, the newspapers and all the other business interests depend upon the men who work.
Yet they did not help them when the workers struggled to better their conditions.”  Now, the
Majority lamented, the “workers are going back to work in the mills without the protection of
the union.  This means that wages will be lower and working conditions worse.  To the
sentimental side cold commercialism is deaf so we will merely call attention to the fact that less
wages for the men means less wages for the merchants.”  But, the column concluded,
“Unionism cannot be crushed as long as there is life, for unionism is the spirit of life.”152
Chapter Four: Trying to Change the Union; Too Little, Too Late
The 1909-1910 strike convinced many, and was only further proof for others, that the
craft union policies of the conservative leadership were no longer effective in the face of the
technological changes in the mills and the creation of multi-plant corporations.  The
Amalgamated Association had never been able to make a successful transition from iron to steel,
and the leadership had continued to concentrate their organization efforts among skilled workers.
By the time of the strike, out of a corporation of about 118,000 employees, the union counted less
than 8,000 among its members.1  The gains in membership in the 1890s, after the Homestead
strike, had been misleading.  Union leaders believed that they could find refuge in the finishing
plants that relied on highly skilled workers, but the creation of U. S. Steel negated the strength
the union possessed through their skill.  The mergers enabled the company to wait out the union
and re-open select plants from the existing labor pool.  The union was nearly powerless in these
circumstances because their strategy relied on the strategic importance of their skill to the
company.2
Many members had foreseen the need to restructure the union to remain an effective
collective bargaining agent under the new circumstances.  They pushed to change the
Amalgamated Association away from craft unionism toward industrial unionism; a union that
disregarded skill as either a qualification for membership or for special status within the
organization.  There were movements toward industrial unionism throughout its history but they
all ended in failure.
For various reasons, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers had
always been resistant to change.  First, the AAISTW was repeatedly weakened by internal
conflicts and an inability to make local lodges adhere to its national policies.  The second reason
was that the constitution put all the power into the hands of the delegate convention.  Because the
membership already consisted of only the most highly paid workers, the annual convention was,
thus, made up of the elite of the elite, the “labor aristocracy.”  The labor aristocracy had the most
to gain from maintaining the status quo and the most to lose from radical change.  Finally, the
AFL reinforced the conservative policies of the AAISTW through its financial support and sheer
influence.
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The failures of the union in key strikes like the 1909-1910 strike and its conservative
response to the losses led members to seek forms of organization other than trade unionism to
achieve economic justice.  Often these alternatives were in competition with one another for
adherents, and the result was a fractured labor movement.  Independent companies facing this
divided front were able to push U. S. Steel’s open shop movement into their mills, further
diminishing the steelworkers’ opportunities for collective bargaining.
Industrial unionism, though it attracted numerous subscribers within the AAISTW, was
contradictory to conventional wisdom.  Throughout its history the Amalgamated Association was
an exclusive union.  Even at its height just before the 1892 Homestead strike, only 24,068 of the
approximately 100,000 workers eligible for membership actually belonged.3  In his study of the
steelworkers published in 1910, John Fitch observed that the “Association has always been an
organization of skilled workers and has centered its efforts on securing better conditions for that
class of labor alone.”4  Through the first decade of the union, membership was expressly limited
to puddlers, boilers, heaters, roll hands, nailers, hammermen, and helpers, all of whom were
skilled workers.5  This approach to organization defies the axiom that there is strength in
numbers.  Why would the members of the Amalgamated Association consciously limit their
numbers?
The reason for this policy is found in the roots of the organization.  The Amalgamated
Association was created by the craft unions of the different trades in the mills.  The five
prominent and successful national ironworkers’ unions which formed the Amalgamation in 1876
were the United Sons of Vulcan (boilers and puddlers), the Brotherhood of Iron and Steel
Heaters, the Rollers and Roughers of the United States, the Iron and Steel Roll Hands’ Union
(catchers, hookers, helpers, and others), and the United Nailers.6  Each union represented skilled
workers who labored in the same mill but were separated by their work and remained isolated in
their respective unions.  When they joined forces, they brought with them the principles of
organization that had brought them success in the past.
Ironworkers viewed themselves as producers and were paid according to how much they
produced.7  This was not viewed initially as a form of wage labor, but as part of a system of
production that resembled the artisan system.  The artisan system had been in use in all branches
of manufacturing for centuries.  In that system, masters selected young men to be apprentices to
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live with the master and learn the trade over many years.  Ultimately they would graduate to the
journeyman level and perform work that required more skill.  Finally, the journeyman would
become a master and select his own apprentices and journeymen.8  While ironworkers ostensibly
worked in a far more industrial setting, the system was very similar.  The skilled worker, whether
he was a puddler, roller, or any of the other skilled workers in the mill, would hire his own
helpers and teach them the skills of working with metal.  These helpers had various levels of skill
and experience and would ultimately become puddlers or rollers in their own right.9
Like artisans, ironworkers coveted the skills of their trade.  As one ironworker, who later
worked in the Elwood tin plate mills, said:
My father was an iron worker, and his father before him.  My people had been workers in
metal from the time when the age of farming in Wales gave way to the birth of modern
industries.  They were proud of their skill, and the secrets of the trade were passed from
father to son as a legacy of great value, and were never told to persons outside the family.
Such skill meant good wages when there was work.  But there was not work all the time.
Had there been jobs enough for all we would have taught our trade to all.  But in self-
protection we thought of our own mouths first.  All down the generations my family has
been face to face with the problem of bread.10
Thus, like the artisan, puddling or rolling iron was much more than wage labor;  workers viewed
their skills as assurance of a livelihood.
Meanwhile, working around the skilled crews was an ever-growing army of day laborers
who fed raw materials into the blast furnaces, transported ingots and bars around the mills, and
performed the other menial tasks of the mills.  These unskilled workers were not admitted into
the upper echelon of the iron and steel workers and were excluded from the union.  Skilled
workers kept abreast of prices, demand, production figures, and everything else on the business
side of the industry.  For example, one of the reasons the founding members of the Sons of
Vulcan began meeting was to discuss these business conditions.  Furthermore, they were familiar
with the fundamentals of organization: the procedures and protocol, the history, and the wisdom
of the leaders.11  One day, the apprentice, too, would have learned and experienced enough to
take an active part in the union.  The unskilled worker was viewed by the various skilled crews as
nothing more than a strong back who cared little about business conditions and did not have a
permanent interest in the mill.  For the members of the craft unions who were all skilled workers
with years of experience, it made no sense to admit the masses of these unlearned workers.
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Since the Amalgamated Association was an amalgamation of craft unions, its constitution
and ideology reflected the constitutions of the constituent organizations.  The Association’s
constitution explicitly excluded all but the skilled workers.  Also it placed all the power in the
national convention of delegates, and strikes had to be sanctioned by the national lodge or
financial support would be withheld and charters revoked.  These features prevented changes
from originating in one local movement and spreading,12 but when the great changes set in
motion by the Bessemer process began, the union was not well equipped to deal with them.
Their organization was based on experience and tradition, and the skilled workers were
conservative and resisted change.13
Contemporary critics and historians alike have attributed the union’s decline to its
leaders’ conservative nature and their adherence to the status quo.14  While that is certainly true,
it is not the whole picture.  The constitution of the Amalgamated Association evolved as the
officers and delegates responded to the pressures of the changing industry,15 and there were
repeated attempts to change the conservative nature of the organization.  By the 1880s, many
were already promoting industrial unionism.  The leading proponents of industrial unionism at
the time were the Knights of Labor.  In fact, the Knights sought to create an organization that
included all working people regardless of their industry.  The only people excluded were bankers,
stockbrokers, lawyers, gamblers, liquor dealers, and others whom they viewed as parasites.  The
Knights of Labor began as a secret organization replete with rituals and was not referred to
publicly prior to 1882, when the organization experienced a rapid ascent.  By the summer of
1886, they were the most powerful labor organization in the country with nearly 750,000
members.16  Unskilled workers were drawn to the organization, and its influence was felt in the
steel industry.
The Knights formed local assemblies in mills from Andrew Carnegie’s massive Edgar
Thomson plant to the relatively small nail mill in Mingo Junction, Ohio.17  Their influence on the
iron and steel industry has yet to be fully explored, but it was enough to cause concern among the
Amalgamated Association leadership.  In 1888, Secretary William Martin of the Amalgamated
Association, urged the union to “take in every man in the mills outside of common labor, and
him too, if necessary.”  The union must, he asserted, counter the “inroads” being made by the
Knights of Labor.  Accusing the Amalgamated lodges of being “aristocratic” and “narrow,” he
70
urged them to be “liberal and admit to membership the men whom the Knights of Labor are
playing to reduce wages . . .  We mean the unskilled workmen . . . Yes, even the daily laborer.
We have nothing to lose and all to gain by the admittance of these men.  All they ask is
recognition.  Failing to get that they naturally seek and get in the Knights of Labor.”18
The Knights drifted into obscurity after a failed railway strike in 1887, but their influence
on the Amalgamated Association remained.  While members of the Knights of Labor lost faith in
the organization and defected to the AFL,19 the Amalgamated Association still pushed toward
industrial unionism.  In 1889, a measure was adopted opening the union to all workers directly
involved in iron and steel production, even the common laborer at the discretion of locals,20 but
the broad based organization never happened.  This was mainly because local lodges still
discriminated against the “helpers” or semi-skilled workers, the unskilled laborers,21 and
especially immigrants.22  The organization remained “top-heavy” in character.23  At the time of
the Homestead strike in 1892, still only a small percentage of the workers in the plant belonged
to the union.  Some may not have had an interest in the union, but many, especially the
immigrants were still excluded, if not expressly, in practice.  Even after the Homestead strike,
when the union turned away from basic steel mills and focused on the tin plate industry, some tin
plate workers were not admitted.  For example, when the tin house workers approached the
Amalgamated Association in 1898, they were told to form their own organization as they would
be able to more effectively protect their interests.24
After the Homestead strike, the rank and file of the union became discontented and
complained that the organization was not democratic enough.  In 1894, one local in Akron, Ohio,
proposed that wage scales and constitutional amendments be voted on in referendums.  The
delegates’ convention, however, rejected this.  In 1901, it was proposed that officers be elected
by the members at large, but this too was rejected.25  The message was clear:  the union would
continue to be run by the delegates convention and not by the membership at large.
The concentration of power in the elite began to fracture the already weakened union.  In
1907, puddlers, who by now were an insignificant part of the iron and steel industry but a
significant part of the union, were fed up with the lack of attention their branch received.  They
left the Amalgamated Association en masse and reformed the old Sons of Vulcan.26  They
remained a separate organization for several years until their local lodges were broken by
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independent employers such as the A. M. Byers Company in Girard, Ohio.  During World War I,
many puddlers would rejoin the Amalgamated Association.27  The exodus of the puddlers
fractured the Amalgamated Association all the way down to the local level.  Michael Tighe
appeared at the OVTLA’s April 28, 1907 meeting to oppose the admittance of the Sons of
Vulcan No. 1, of Benwood, into the organization.  The OVTLA president at the time, William
Maxwell, was a delegate from Sons of Vulcan No. 1.  After much debate and internal conflict,
Maxwell left the OVTLA for the “sake of peace and harmonie [sic],” and took the Sons of
Vulcan No. 1 with him.28
Even workers in the sheet and tin plate mills felt slighted by the Amalgamated leadership.
In 1908, John A. Conkel, representing the roughers, pair heaters, heaters’ helpers, openers, and
shearmen of the Aetna-Standard plant, also known there as the “day-hands,” wrote directly to
Samuel Gompers complaining that the rollers and heaters had not treated them fairly.  The day-
hands had recently been put on the tonnage basis as opposed to a daily rate, and the result was a
reduction in wages from anywhere between ten to forty percent.  Conkel said that they were
interested in forming a new lodge and had had three well attended meetings already.  About one
hundred and sixty had signed their roster locally, but if granted a charter, he was confident that
“the day hands all over the country will organize at once as committees from different mills have
been to our meetings.”  These workers, he assured Gompers, were not members of the
Amalgamated Association nor had they ever been.  Furthermore, they did not wish to belong to
the AAISTW which was why they wrote directly to Gompers.  If they had contacted the president
of the Ohio chapter of the AFL, Llewellyn Lewis, who was also a vice president of the
Amalgamated Association, they were sure he would “try to round us up for the A. A.,” and the
day hands, as Conkel put it, “don’t want nothing to do with the A. A.”29  Upon hearing about
Conkel’s request, John Williams of the AAISTW told the secretary of the AFL that the
Federation must refuse them a charter.  Firstly, he argued that the day hands’ “very admission of
not having taken any interest in the affairs of the Association is one of the pungent reasons as to
why we were compelled to take a reduction on sheet mills this year.”  Secondly, Williams
disagreed with Conkel saying that the day hands had “been mainstays of our Association and
their sub-lodges.”  Williams concluded that the AFL could not be too severe in their
condemnation of this upstart movement because “if carried out it cannot but result in the
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destruction of all organizations in that branch of the steel industry.”30  Consequently, the AFL did
not grant the day hands a charter.
Some who remained dedicated to the AAISTW continued to push industrial unionism.  In
1907, Llewellyn Lewis found men at a sheet mill in Zanesville, Ohio, ready to organize, but they
were afraid to enter the Amalgamated Association for fear of being discharged.  Lewis reported
that they were, however, willing to join the AFL, because the workers knew the company was
“not so much opposed to them” joining the AFL as opposed to the Amalgamated Association.”
Contrary to Conkel’s beliefs about Lewis, he suggested that the AFL grant the Zanesville
steelworkers a charter with the hope that later they could be convinced to form an Amalgamated
lodge.31  Thus, unlike Williams, Lewis put organizing of the workers above the interests of his
own union.  At the beginning of 1909, Llewellyn Lewis argued that the “strength of the
Amalgamated Association (or any other organization) depends on its comprehensiveness, and our
aim must be to spread out and have every man working around the iron and steel mills in one
organization.”32  In February he wrote to the Amalgamated Journal that he had been “for several
years in favor of the initiative and referendum in our organization in making our constitutional
laws and electing our officers.”  With initiative and referendum the delegate convention would
still meet, but when the general membership thought the delegates had ceased to represent their
best interests they could repeal or enact laws by a majority of the membership.  The only
objection he found was that some believed that the membership of the union was not competent
to vote on laws or elect the officers.  In response to this objection he quoted U. S. Senator
Jonathan Bourne: “The man afraid to trust the people should not be trusted by the people.”
Lewis concluded with the hope that the issue would by “thoroughly thrashed out” in the
Amalgamated Journal before the next convention met and that he would personally be willing to
debate any officer on the matter.33
President P. J. McArdle immediately responded that Lewis’s statement was “more in the
nature of a challenge than as being an ordinary emphatic declaration in favor of a certain
proposition.”  McArdle was opposed to the initiative and referendum proposition “in any of the
numerous forms that it has been presented,” and accepted the invitation to debate Lewis.34  In
March, McArdle and Lewis met in Wheeling and debated the initiative and referendum matter.
Each spoke for thirty minutes and then for fifteen minutes in response to one another.  One
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member in attendance reported that “to say it was an interesting meeting is letting it down light.”
Those who were there found it thrilling and enlightening, but attendance was not good.  “If the
membership wanted a change as bad as some of the members try to make you believe, why the
attendance would have better.  I think if there was more time spent in trying to build up our
organization, and less in the other ‘isms,’ we’d get along much better.”35  Truthfully, many had
already lost hope that the union would change.  Poor attendance and unpaid dues were frequent
complaints in early 1909.36
At the 1909 convention, the initiative and referendum resolution was again voted down.
After the June 1, 1909 open shop announcement, many members thought the failure of this
resolution epitomized the problems with the union.  W. H. Evans, a frequent writer to the
Amalgamated Journal and the National Labor Tribune, complained bitterly that the “gang” had
defeated the measure.  Evans argued that if the “rank and file of the A. A. had been permitted to
select their officers and had a voice in its affairs” the union “would not be in its present helpless
condition upon the broad of its back with these combines grappling its throat.”37  J. H. Gamble of
Granite City, Illinois, said that the workers would not be faced with their current problems if they
“had a strong fighting militant organization.”  Gamble argued that if they had followed “the
writings of T. M. T. of Piqua, and Hugo of Martins Ferry, O., who have written for years for an
industrial form of organization and made laws to that effect” then the American Sheet and Tin
Plate Company “would have thought twice before that infamous and unjust proposition.”38
It was not until 1911, the year after the strike that the delegate convention decided that
constitutional amendments would be put up to a referendum vote.  Immediately an amendment
was proposed to have national officers elected by referendum.  Poor turnout for the vote left the
issue to be decided at the following year’s convention when it was adopted.39  The initiative and
referendum amendment had little effect despite the years of effort to get it enacted.  By this time
the Amalgamated Association had been greatly reduced in membership and influence.
Discontent with the Amalgamated Association and trade union structure led to
movements to try to circumvent both.  During 1912 and 1913 there were two insurgent
movements within the union.  The first group, which called themselves the Industrial Iron and
Steel Workers of America, formed in Niles when workers there walked out of the Empire plant.
They wrote a manifesto that called for an organization of “practically all workmen working in
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and about said industries with one single exception - that is, the rollers.”40  The second group was
called themselves the Progressive Movement of the A. A. I. S. and T. W.  Their goals were,
among other things, industrial unionism and, specifically, the extension of referendums in the
union.41  These attempts to create a new union were unable to gain momentum and failed.
According to historian David Brody, the Amalgamated Association would probably have
held “small future importance” after their descent began if it did not have “legitimate
jurisdiction” over all steelworkers under the AFL.  According to its constitution, the Federation
had to involve the Amalgamated Association in any effort to organize the steel industry.42
Certainly after 1901, and probably since the Homestead strike, the AAISTW needed the support
of the AFL.  While some in the Association had sought to make it more of an industrial union,
the Amalgamated leaders had adhered to the principles of craft unionism, which fit nicely with
the AFL’s conservative ideology.  Strangely, Samuel Gompers had been an early proponent of
industrial unionism.  In 1888, he had advocated that conventions based on industrial divisions,
and that representatives from those conventions, should be sent to the AFL convention.  Thus, all
of the metal industry unions, for example, would meet and elect delegates to represent the
workers from the entire industry.  Under his plan, the AFL would have eventually become a
collection of industrial unions, but this met with such sharp disapproval that Gompers dropped
the plan and became the leading spokesman of craft unionism.43  In the years after that, the
AAISTW had also rejected industrial unionism, and a bond formed between the two
organizations that proved to be enduring.
By 1909, there were few in the Amalgamated Association that questioned its membership
in the Federation, but they originally had a rocky relationship.  Gompers later recalled that at the
labor congress in Pittsburgh in 1881, as the Federation was coming into existence, one of the
“most important men” there was John Jarrett, the president of the Association, “then the
strongest trade union.”44  At the conference, Jarrett insisted that a resolution calling for protective
tariffs be adopted, and the following year in Cleveland when that resolution was repealed, Jarrett
and the Amalgamated Association withdrew from the AFL.45  Furthermore, some of the AFL’s
most critical concerns were contradictory to that of the Amalgamated Association, the eight-hour
day movement for example.  Ironworkers were paid on a tonnage basis that was tied to the
market price.  The twelve-hour and five heat day were entrenched traditions among ironworkers,
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and many were suspicious of trying to change the length of the workday for that reason alone.
Others feared that, once they changed to eight hours, they would not have the clout to get the
increase in the wage scale that would be necessary to ensure them the daily wage that they had
been receiving.46  Thus, initially the two organizations were at odds.  Finally, the 1901 clash
between T. J. Shaffer and Samuel Gompers led to animosity on a personal level.
In both 1901 and 1909, the Amalgamated presidents asked Gompers to do for their union
what he had done for the miners’ union in 1897.  From the perspective of Shaffer and McArdle,
the United Mine Workers of America was in dire straits at the beginning of 1897.  During the
miners’ strike that year Gompers and the AFL became involved to such an extent as to both win
the strike, securing better wages and consequently the eight hour day, and turn the UMWA into
one of the strongest unions in the country.  Gompers responded to both Shaffer and McArdle that
the circumstances had been entirely different.  Several coal operators supported the miners’ strike
which sought to bring uniform wages.  Furthermore, most of the bituminous miners were on
strike, and only a few specific regions had yet to stop mining.  Thus, when the AFL organized a
conference that was held in Wheeling on July 27, 1897, the participating union leaders only
needed to focus organizing efforts on the minority of miners.  Conversely, in 1901 and 1909 the
majority of steelworkers did not belong to the union and were not on strike.  They did not have
the support of any of the companies.  In fact, the various steel concerns around the country were
hoping U. S. Steel would win so they too could push the open shop.  In other words, the AFL
would have had to take on a much broader fight to unionize the steel industry.47  Gompers
responded in 1901 to Shaffer by contacting the National Civic Federation and working toward
conciliation.  In 1909, he did organize the December meeting at the Monongahela Hotel which
was similar to the 1897 Wheeling meeting, and the national union leaders who came out of that
meeting vowed to “completely organize all employees in the iron, steel and tin plate industry and
subsidiary co-related trades.”  Unfortunately, Gompers was only able to enlist less than a dozen
organizers willing to take on the task of organizing the steel industry.  Neither action proved
helpful for the Amalgamated Association.
Gompers grand scheme for defeating U. S. Steel did not focus on extensive organizing
efforts anyway.  He had been lobbying for an investigation of U. S. Steel on the basis that it
violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.  Originally, the AFL petitioned President Howard Taft, but
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Taft referred the whole matter to the U. S. Attorney General Wickersham.48  Congress did
investigate and held hearings on U. S. Steel, but they merely told Elbert Gary that he could no
longer set prices for the whole steel industry.  Gompers, years later recalled that, in regards to
organizing the steel industry in 1909:
My plan was to have a committee of representatives of those organizations immediately
concerned and to accompany the work of organization with a demand upon the
government to investigate the United States Steel Corporation.  I did not believe in the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law because I did not believe that legislation would prevent normal,
necessary development of industry; but since the law was on the statute books and the
practices of the steel corporation were in open and flagrant violation of that law and since
the corporation denied to wage-earners the right of collective action which they arrogated
to themselves, it seemed to me that the labor movement was in a strategic position to call
attention to the situation.49
P. J. McArdle initially welcomed the assistance of the AFL, but was sorely disappointed,
if not disgusted, with the pitiful assistance that finally arrived.  After so much rhetoric and raised
expectations, the handful of organizers and the plea to the federal government that Gompers
made were hardly the kind of tactics for which McArdle had hoped.  There were no sympathy
strikes called, not enough funding to seriously advance the strike, and no extensive campaign to
shift public opinion in the steelworkers’ favor.  Thus, while the AFL imposed upon the
Amalgamated Association a strict trade union structure that hindered its progress, at critical times
the support the Association needed did not arrive.  Meanwhile, the steelworkers were left with a
union that could not meet the challenges of organizing skilled and unskilled workers, and
Americans and immigrants into the same union.
After the 1909-1910 strike the AFL and the Amalgamated Association made a concerted
effort to organize the whole steel industry; not just the skilled divisions and not just the skilled
workers.  The labor aristocracy finally recognized that their narrow approach of the past could no
longer be successful in the modern steel industry, and they sought to include every worker, even
the unskilled immigrants.  In 1910, McArdle wrote to Gompers, saying that immigrants had
“largely displaced native born and other English men in labor.”  He informed Gompers that this
was especially true where mechanical improvements had reduced the need for skill and continued
to say that while immigrants were employed “as a fixed policy of the steel manufacturers after
the Homestead Strike in 1892,” that it had been “carried to a fuller fruition” by U. S. Steel.50  The
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American Federationist declared that so “wisely have the managers of the steel corporation
planned to prevent co-operation of workers, that the assemblage in their mills is like the meeting
of many nations - a most complete execution of their publicly declared policy in favor of foreign
workers.  This modern Tower of Babel breeds confusion and isolation of workers because of the
separation arising because of many tongues.”51  Truly, by the time of the 1909-1910 strike,
immigrants held the majority of jobs in the large steel mills.  For example, sixty percent of
Carnegie Steel’s employees were unskilled immigrants.52
In 1912, the AFL launched a new organizing drive.  In August of that year a circular was
issued declaring that the “time is at hand when the iron and steel workers, regardless of their
mechanical ability, their creed, color, or nationality, should be bound together by a true spirit of
fraternity and solidarity - features which are essential if you hope to abolish wrongs, attain rights,
and improve conditions.”  It instructed workers that there would be two circulars to follow.  The
next would explain the aims of organized labor, the conditions under which the mill workers
suffered presently, and what could be accomplished through organization.  The third and final
circular would designate a single day when all the mill workers in all the various towns could
meet in order to organize.  The reason all the meetings would take place on the same day was to
“prevent discrimination.”  The circular concluded by telling immigrants to write their friends and
family “across the water” and advise them not to come to America for a year or two.53  By as late
as March, 1913, the first stage was, evidently, completed, and the American Federationist
reported that organizers had been “quietly, persistently, and steadily” spreading the word of trade
unionism in the steel mills.  This time they targeted immigrants.  “Organized labor, now as
always,” the article claimed, “is the one institution that aims and tends to convert foreign
workmen into American citizens.”  Toward that end, the AFL’s most recent circular was
translated into twelve languages.54  Despite these efforts, the AFL had little success beyond
intermittent and purely local revolts by the workers of U. S. Steel.
They were unable to reverse the momentum of the open shop drive.  Simply deciding to
include everyone could not undo the previous twenty years of backsliding.  Organizing
immigrants was only one of many obstacles that the AFL and the Amalgamated Association
faced in organizing the work force.  While immigrants held the majority in the mills, there were
still thousands of Americans working the mills that two organizations failed to attract.  The
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highly skilled workers, for example, were often promoted to foreman positions with a chance of
moving into management.  Many of these workers could not see the need for a union as they
were content with their working conditions and wages.  Their helpers in the rolling mills and
other more skilled areas coveted the same promotions, hoping they too would ultimately make
more money and work less strenuous jobs.55  The overall picture, however, was one of
diminishing wages, longer hours, and increasingly worse working conditions.  Consequently,
many workers remained devoted to bettering their conditions, but U. S. Steel employed a variety
of methods to safeguard its mills against the union.
AFL organizer J. D. Pierce, who worked in the Ohio Valley, outlined U. S. Steel’s
methods.  U. S. Steel, he said, had an “effective Blacklist” that kept “their employes from
expressing their true feelings.”  Employees would be put on the blacklist if they attended union
meetings or promoted unionism among fellow workers.  As Pierce explained that being put on
the blacklist meant more than “interfering with men obtaining employment but reaches the
landlord, the grocer and butcher who are told not to give credit to such employees on threat of
incurring the displeasure of the corporation.”  The result of the blacklist was tremendous.  Pierce
said that it had “so broken the spirit of the men that they do not place confidence in each other
dare not speak to each other for fear a word may be dropped that may reach the ear of the
foreman.”56  Pierce also charged that, to keep unions, U. S. Steel had “established their detective
bureau and have a complete organization in every place where mill are located.”  The picture he
presented was grim:  “They have complete control of all borough officials from the lowest to the
highest, ready and willing to do their bidding.  Business men dare not oppose them through fear
of the banks which they do business with.  In fact they are thoroughly entrenched with a perfect
organization and with unlimited money.”57
Directly after the 1909-1910 strike in the Wheeling district, the U. S. Steel plants were
restarted one by one.  The LaBelle plant was the last of the three U. S. Steel tin plate plants in the
district to restart, which it did in late February, 1911.58  To some degree, the plants restarted with
a new work force.  The Ohio Valley Trades and Labor Assembly wrote to Samuel Gompers that
since the 1909-1910 strike that it was “impossible for an old employee who took any interest in
the strike to get a job, whilst they will not tell them out right that that is the cause, but there is no
work for him.”  The Assembly agreed with Pierce that U. S. Steel’s influence went beyond hiring
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and firing.  They reported that the environment in Wheeling had turned distinctly against
organized labor because U. S. Steel had “subsidized the press to such an extent that our daily
papers have positively refused to print any labor news either from our Assembly nor from the
Belmont Central Trades and Labor Assembly.”  Furthermore, “their activity in politics is such
that they almost dictate the election of certain men.”59
The effect of U. S. Steel’s influence was felt among Wheeling’s steelworkers who, in
May, 1914, arranged to have a union meeting and invited AFL organizer John L. Lewis to attend.
However, Lewis reported that “owing to conditions down there, the meeting failed to materialize
and my trip was fruitless.”60  Many no longer believed that even the powerful AFL could help
them fight the corporation.  The problems facing the steelworkers seemed insurmountable.  U. S.
Steel, they believed, had influence among local businessmen, the local press, and the local, state,
and federal government.  It seemed that all the institutions of the nation had turned against them.
Since they no longer had the protection of the AAISTW and the AFL seemed powerless,
steelworkers sought solutions outside of their union.  While they believed in the core principles
of trade unionism -- that they needed protection from the companies and corporations that
employed them and that collective action was the only way to get that protection -- many began
to wonder whether unions could ever meet their needs.
Gompers and other strict trade unionists argued that the government had proven
repeatedly that workers could not rely on legislation or the courts to protect them.  Therefore,
they must rely solely on their union and union contracts with employers for everything including
benefits, relief, and security.  This forced the union leaders into the uncomfortable position of
opposing government reforms such as the minimum wage and maximum hours laws. This
philosophy, called voluntarism, dominated the AFL and its affiliated unions after 1900. 61
Llewellyn Lewis, who had been president of the Ohio Federation of Labor and a vice-president of
the Amalgamated Association, believed that trade unionism was the only way for working people
to better their lives.  He asked:  “When officials of a great corporation are permitted to lead mobs
against honest citizens of other states or their own state; when the state is so rotten under the
control of the money power; when in all the space between abject submission and rebellion no
place is given for appeal, argument or protest, what is the remedy?”  His answer was that if
workers only added “a little courage” to their convictions that their trade union would flourish
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and carry them “to a place in life that will give you peace, prosperity and happiness.”62  However,
as time and time again the Association and the AFL failed, even Lewis became disillusioned.
Lewis resigned from the union blaming craft union approach of the Association and the AFL for
the failure of the 1909 organizing drive in which he had been so involved.  He parted saying that
the AFL’s “policies are antiquated and unfit for application to present day conditions.  The
policies of 25 years ago won’t do for today.  The world is moving and we must move onward
with it or be left far behind.”63
Others believed that trade union membership was important, but also that government as
it now stood could be changed to serve the needs of the working class.  Matt Greer, president of
Wheeling’s Prosperity Lodge, wrote that the November 1909, labor parade through Wheeling
was “an eye opener to the business men of Wheeling to see the host of labor all join in one
common cause against the open shop.”  If only they could vote as they had marched, he reflected,
then workers would not be asked to work in open shops or suffer government by injunction.
When workers vote together then they “will have equal rights for all and special privileges for
none, as guaranteed by the consititution.”64
An increasing number of workers disagreed, concluding that the government and the
capitalist system that it promoted must be changed radically in order for it to serve the working
class.  The Socialist Party was a political organization that sought to effect such a change.  While
party members were certainly not discouraged from belonging to labor unions, Socialists
believed that in order to achieve social justice, they must do it at the election booth.  Two-time
Socialist Party presidential nominee Eugene Debs, however, was opposed to conservative unions
like the AFL and the Amalgamated Association claiming that companies allowed such unions to
continue so as to prevent socialism from growing.  “Why didn’t the steel trust annihilate the
Amalgamated Steelworkers?” he asked in a 1905 speech in Chicago.  “The trust had its iron heel
upon the neck of the Steelworks’ Union, and could have, had it chosen, completely crushed the
life out of it,” but J. P. Morgan and Charles Schwab, he contended, “have discovered that a union
can be turned the other way; that it can be made useful to them instead of being useful to the
working class.”  The steel magnates came to favor trade unions “because they knew that another
and a better one would spring from its ruins.  They were perfectly willing that the old craft union
should grow up again and block the way to real union.”65  Gompers even used this logic in
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defense of the AFL arguing that if their “constructive and conservative labor movement” was
“outlawed” that ultimately it would be replaced by “another movement not constructive and not
conservative in character.”66  In the words of one party leader, Morris Hilquit, Socialists sought
“not only collective ownership, but also democratic administration of the industries”  Just as
Democracy meant political self-government, Socialism meant industrial self-government.
Ultimately, they hoped that industry would resemble the American government, where
representatives would be elected to run businesses and remain subject to the electorate.67
There was a strong Socialist element in the Amalgamated Association by the time of the
1909-1910 strike.  W. H. Evans wrote that “at the ballot box on next election day is the only
place the workingman can hold his own.”  As long as workingmen had to work for wages to
purchase food and clothing as they did “under the present system of private ownership” that
companies would be able to close down mills and dictate the price they would pay for that labor
as well as the working conditions.  He urged steelworkers: “Study up Socialism boys and see
what they can do for you.  You have tried the other side long enough.”68
Eugene V. Debs came to Wheeling in March 1910 and spoke to a full house at the
Victoria theatre.  He outlined the purpose of the Socialist Party saying that they hoped to
restructure society and form the first industrial democracy that the world had ever seen.  “Society
has always been organized on a basis of exploitation of those who toil,” he told the audience.  “In
ancient times, the ruling classes made slaves of the workingmen; in the middle ages, they made
serfs of them and in modern time, they have made them wage workers.”  Socialism would finally
change that, and workers would be the ones benefitting from their labor. 69
The Socialist Party gained a great deal of support in the Wheeling district after the strike,
beating the Republicans in some districts, but falling short of electing their candidates.  “The
Socialists of Wheeling, of the Ohio Valley and of West Virginia have joined the rest of the
country in making an excellent showing in the elections just over,” the Wheeling Majority
declared after the November 1910 election.70  Over a year after the steel strike had ended, Debs
returned to Wheeling on October 18, 1911, to speak at a high school auditorium.  He commended
the “valiant unionists” of the area “for the magnificent battle they put up against the Steel Trust.”
He did not spare the superlatives claiming that “no men anywhere ever made a better fight, and if
they had fought everywhere as you fought here, the battle would have ended in a victory for the
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workers.”  Yet he told the listeners that they were ignorant and kept ignorant for the benefit of
the ruling class.  “That is why the old party politicians, in their speeches, call you intelligent, only
to keep you ignorant.  And that is why the Socialist tells you [that] you are ignorant, in order that
you may become intelligent.”  He concluded:  “You must organize and act industrially and
politically.  Organize politically, not through the expectation of rewarding your ‘friends and
punishing your enemies,’ but in the class conscious Socialist party.  Organize industrially, not in
obsolete petty craft unions, but by industries where the combined weight of the workers in an
industry can be brought to bear.”71
Another group of Socialists believed that the government would never be changed to
benefit workers by conventional methods.  The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) believed
that when the workers were “fully organized and class conscious” they could seize industries at
the “point of production” and administer them by and for the workers.  Like the Socialist Party,
the IWW believed that society would necessarily have to be restructured in order to get justice
for the workers, but the IWW did not believe that workers would ever gain control of the
workplace through union contracts or through political action.  Instead, they believed that only
through revolutionary action would the workers ever achieve an industrial democracy.72
During the 1909-1910 strike, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) set up a relief
station in New Castle that was open to all strikers.  This was greatly appreciated, especially by
the immigrants who were not members of the Amalgamated Association and, therefore, not
eligible for strike relief.73  In other locations, like Wheeling, immigrants drifted to other jobs or
assisted the company in reopening the plants.  In New Castle, the IWW assistance given to and
the organization of the unskilled workers made it possible to keep all the workers in line and
firmly set against the company.74  At the same time, the IWW won a victory for immigrant
workers in a plant of the Pressed Steel Car Company in McKees Rocks.  Traditional union
wisdom had held that immigrants made poor union men, but the IWW was having tremendous
success in organizing these workers.75
Publicly, P. J. McArdle supported the IWW saying that the Amalgamated Association
would “maintain a faithful alliance with the Tin Workers Association and the I.W.W. until a
conclusion has been reached and an agreement signed with all three organizations.”76  The
alliance in New Castle, however, was isolated and temporary.  Privately, McArdle admitted to
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Frank Morrison of the AFL that he was worried:  “There is no question but that more and more
of the foreign-born workers in the industry are becoming impressed by the vision held out by the
Industrial Unionists, and the victory at McKees Rocks has given them a strong talking point so
much so, in fact, that even our members are beginning to pay attention to what they say.  While it
was necessary for us to cooperate with them at New Castle, we certainly do not look forward to
the prospect of their growing influence among the iron, steel, and tin workers.”  There was no
reason to “bewail these unfortunate developments,” but the AFL had to prove itself “capable of
winning the strike against the American Sheet and Tin Plate Company and move to organize all
the non-union mills in the industry.”  Otherwise, McArdle implied, the Association and the
Federation would soon see their members desert to organizations that were having success in the
steel industry.77
The IWW’s influence would be felt in the Wheeling district not long after the 1909-1910
strike.  Independents were beginning to rival U. S. Steel in their opposition to organized labor.
During the 1909-1910 strike the Phillips Sheet and Tin Plate Company of Clarksburg, West
Virginia, moved into the Wheeling district and would ultimately enormous impact on the region.
The man behind the new venture was E. T. Weir, for whom the town of Weirton and Weirton
Steel were named.  Weirton Steel ultimately grew to become West Virginia’s single largest
employer.
Weir had been the superintendent at the Monessen plant of U. S. Steel where they used
the two-roll system of making tin plate that was so disliked by the workers.  In 1904, they were
the first to use open-hearth steel on the two-roll or two mill system.  It had not previously been
thought “practical” because of the “great care” required in the rolling process.  Weir said that
“the fact that the men employed at the Monessen mill have successfully worked the open-hearth
steel on the two mill systems goes to show that they are as skilled in the rolling of tin-plate as any
workmen in the world.”78  In May 1909, the Phillips company broke ground for the new tin plate
plant.79  Weir cited two reasons for locating the plant on the Ohio River across from
Steubenville:  river access to cheap raw materials and close proximity to the most skilled workers
in the industry.  “We get the better class of workmen here because the best labor will not leave
the Pittsburgh district.  They have been here for generations and refuse to change.  For this reason
we elected Weirton for the new plant which will start with eight hot mills and a tin house.”80  In
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late October, 1909, Weir, now president of the Phillips company, began networking at the
Waldorf-Astoria hotel in New York, now a member of the steel elite.81  In December, the
company announced that there were 1,000 openings for workmen at the new plant, and striking
workers from the U. S. Steel plant applied for the jobs.82  The mill began operations in February,
1910, and in April, hundreds of new houses were being built by the Phillips company in
Weirton.83  Thus, in less than a year, Weir and the company had become a force in the Wheeling
district.
The Phillips Sheet and Tin Plate Company purchased the Pope Mill in Steubenville, and
in 1913, the tin house workers in Wheeling and Follansbee, employed by other independent
companies, decided to push for the organization of the Steubenville plant.  The Industrial
Workers of the World were agitating in the area, and the Socialists of the AFL affiliated Ohio
Valley Trades and Labor Assembly feeling threatened by the rival organization decided to push
for organization on a federated craft basis that included unskilled workers at the Steubenville
plant.84
W. S. Hunt, now president of the TPWIPA, wrote to Samuel Gompers on June 6, 1913,
asking if Gompers could “help us in any manner as regards Weirton.  Of course we intend to
strike if the scale is not signed.”85  The AFL sent general organizers to Steubenville to assist
Amalgamated Association organizers.  They tried to go to Weirton to organize, but John L.
Lewis reported that Weirton was a small town that was “practically owned by the steel
companies” and the organizers were forced to leave town “by the agents of the steel corporation.”
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  The Amalgamated Association held a meeting on June 30 and called a strike.  Lewis
addressed the strikers in Steubenville on July 10, reporting to Secretary Morrison:  “We have
been lending this assistance to the Amalgamated Association at the request of President [John]
Williams of that organization, and I feel that in the matter of taking care of the foreign element in
the strike at last, we have been able to do them some material good.”  He estimated that the
company had imported between 300 and 400 strike breakers, half of whom were acting as armed
guards on company property, but because Steubenville’s city administration was friendly to
labor, the guards were not allowed to walk the streets.  In all, Lewis felt that the strike was
progressing nicely without desertions and that the prospects were “very good.”87
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Hunt went to Steubenville to inspect the situation himself.  He wrote to Morrison:  “I
have been on the firing line at the mill in Steubenville, Ohio for the past three weeks.  I met your
organizers from Pittsburg all of which were put out of Wierton [sic] by hirelings of the Phillip
[sic] Sheet & Tin Plate Co.”  But the strike had nearly exhausted the TPWIPA’s treasury.  Hunt
contacted the Amalgamated Association to see if the Association was interested in combining,
and the two organizations agreed on terms.  While Hunt was certain that the unification would be
approved, in the meantime the union needed several hundred dollars to holds its annual
conference.  After the forthcoming combination, the Amalgamated Association would obviously
fund them the rest of the way.88  Morrison wrote to AAISTW President Williams that the AFL
was “in no position to appropriate money as per the request of President Hunt” until the AFL’s
Executive Council approved the measure, which he doubted that they would do.  He, therefore,
asked the Amalgamated Association to fund the TPWIPA until they combined.89
Agitation to merge the two unions had begun towards the end of the 1909-1910 strike.  In
fact, some believed that it would happen at the 1910 conventions of the two unions.  The AFL
had recommended that the AAISTW and the TPWIPA merge, and President McArdle concurred.
Then the old craft union rivalries cropped.90  The TPWIPA thought the two organizations should
merge into a new union with a new name as there was still resentment against the Amalgamated
Association for not permitting the tin house workers into their union in the first place.91  “They
should never have been apart,” the Wheeling Majority declared.  “But in the old days of the
Amalgamated they only thought of protecting the high waged skilled men, and did not foresee
that changing industrial conditions, with the ever increasing field of machinery, would make ever
less and less small the field of the purely skilled and make the unskilled man the one with whom
to deal.”  The editorial urged the two unions to find a way to create a union that would ensure
that no one division of workers would be favored over another.92  The merger failed to
materialize in 1910, however, and the two union were still discussing it by the time of the 1913
Steubenville strike. The AA and TPWIPA finally merged on June 30, 1913, but by this time the
TPWIPA only numbered 500 members.93
To what degree the various organizations, the AA, the TPWIPA, the AFL, the socialists
of the OVTLA, and the IWW, participated in the strike is unclear.  What is certain is that the
strike was very violent.  Company guards and strike breakers fired rifles in the direction of mill
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workers’ homes, and gunmen shot several strike leaders from a moving automobile.  Ultimately
the strike was lost.94
The IWW continued to agitate among workers in the area.  Joseph Ettor preached the
“doctrine of the general strike” to striking coal miners in Bellaire, Ohio, in June, 1914.  He said
that it was the shortest way to revolution, the goal of all Socialists, but that the Wheeling
Socialists would never accomplish anything.  They had too great an interest in the status quo, he
argued, as their craft unions were in a favorable position in the present system.  All they would
ever do, he said, was pass decorous resolutions.95  Ettor and other IWW agitators met with some
success among the miners, and kept a close watch on local tin plate industry from Weirton down
to Wheeling, including the recently built tin plate plant at Yorkville, Ohio.  “The tin plate
industry,” they reported, “appears to be in excellent shape, from the standpoint of operation, but
mill owners continue to complain of lack of profits, and to prophesy evil results from ruinous
competition with the Welsh manufacturers.”96
Evidently, the IWW had some success with the local steelworkers as a “disruptionist
movement” was started in 1915 in Wheeling by “certain malcontents,” according to John
Williams, that advocated industrial unionism and even associating with the IWW.  Williams
forbade members from joining the IWW on the grounds that it was a “dual union,” one that
trespassed on the AAISTW’s jurisdiction.  He assured members that the Amalgamated
Association would “never become the tail of a kite to any seceding organization, particularly one
of the character of the I. W. W.”97  As Williams had wished, the movement failed to gain
momentum.
Epilogue
With the start of World War I came a whole new set of circumstances.  As the flow of
immigrants into the United States was seriously stemmed, companies had to deal with a fixed
labor pool.1  Furthermore, as demand increased to meet wartime production, labor was more in
demand.  Workers in the steel industry, sensing their position of increased power, rebelled
against their working conditions.  The federal government under Woodrow Wilson intervened to
ensure continued production for the war effort.  In March 1918, the National War Labor Board
was created to mediate between labor and capital with the principles that employers must
recognize the right of workers to organize into trade unions and that unions must recognize the
right of workers to remain non-union.  With the implied threat that the government could
nationalize the steel industry, Felix Frankfurter, the secretary of the War Labor Policies Board,
was able to coerce men such as Elbert Gary into accepting the eight-hour work day as a standard
and paying time-and-a-half for overtime.2
The result of these concessions and the existence of a federal board recognizing the right
to organize revived the Amalgamated Association.  The National Committee for Organizing Iron
and Steel Workers was created in 1918 with three AFL men in charge: John Fitzpatrick,
president of the Chicago Federation of Labor; William Z. Foster, an organizer for the AFL who
had once been in the IWW and had radical tendencies; and Samuel Gompers, still president of
the AFL.  The Amalgamated Association recognized that they were in no position to demand all
the benefits of the new organizing drive and allowed other unions jurisdiction over many of the
steelworkers, such as the machinists, boilermakers, and electrical workers.3  After a tremendously
successful drive, which began in Johnstown, Youngstown, and Wheeling,4 the industry remained
only partly organized, and the war came to an end.  Employers began to refuse to recognize
unions and to revoke concessions made during the war.  Furthermore, Employee Representation
Plans (ERPs) were inaugurated by companies in an attempt to circumvent legitimate unions.
Tensions built to the point where a strike had to be called despite the fact that the union was not
fully prepared.  On September 22, 1919, after much debate among union leaders, a strike was
called, and about 250,000 workers stopped work, roughly half the industry.5  No longer hindered
by the federal government, companies employed the same tactics to break the strike that had
proven so effective in the past. By September 30, 1919, 15,000 were on strike in Wheeling
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alone.6  Biased newspaper coverage, strikebreakers, and the Pennsylvania State Police went a
long way toward bringing the struggle to an end.  The strike’s failure left many wondering if the
steel industry would ever be unionized again.
In 1920, the Wheeling Steel Corporation was formed, bringing together nearly all the
independent mills that remained in the Wheeling district, Weirton Steel being a notable
exception.  In June 1921, the 1909-1910 strike was replayed on a smaller scale in the Wheeling
District.  The Amalgamated Association asked Wheeling Steel’s president, Isaac M. Scott, to
sign a wage scale for all the plants.  He offered to sign for the plants already covered, meaning
the Whitaker-Glessner plants and Yorkville’s big tin-plate mill.  On June 30, when the scale
expired the Amalgamated called a strike and Wheeling Steel’s unionized mills were shut down.
In February, with increased demand, Scott offered to take the union men back but continued to
refuse to sign a contract for all the plants.  The union workers refused his offer, and non-union
men were brought in to start the mill up again, effectively ending unionism in the Wheeling
district for another twenty years.7
U. S. Steel’s prominence in the Wheeling district waned after the 1909-1910 strike.
Historian Henry Scott wrote that the “acute disturbances in the Wheeling district,” particularly
the strikes of 1901 and 1909, had a “disastrous effect on the attitude of the Steel Corporation
toward this community.”  By 1928, the Aetna-Standard, once one of the “vital units” of U. S.
Steel had been dismantled until only two jobbing mills remained, and the LaBelle tin mills had
been torn down.  Other mills were shut down, and orders were directed to other towns.  By the
1930s, only the Laughlin plant remained active among local U. S. Steel tin plate plants.  Scott
argued that with “the whole United States from which to choose, the big Corporation could
hardly be expected to foster the development of any recalcitrant district.”8
In 1933, Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) as a part of
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal.  Section 7a of the Act formally recognized for the first time in
federal legislation the right of workers to organize.  Strikes broke out almost spontaneously in
response.  Workers at Weirton Steel walked out in 1933 in an effort to gain union recognition,
but E. T. Weir was able to use the existing ERP, as well as coercion and intimidation, to defeat
the effort.9  The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, also known as the Wagner Act, reinforced
section 7a of the NIRA, and new organization efforts were initiated.  The Wagner Act created the
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National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) whose purpose was to govern industrial relations
ensuring that workers’ rights were not violated by companies.  It has been called the workers’ bill
of rights.  In 1937, John L. Lewis and Philip Murray created the Steel Workers Organizing
Committee (SWOC), and unionization of the steel industry began in earnest.
That year, Myron Taylor of U. S. Steel and Lewis held a series of private meetings that
resulted in the recognition of collective bargaining rights among U. S. Steel employees.  Taylor
was not forced to recognize any union by law as the Supreme Court was still determining the
constitutionality of the Wagner Act, but he probably did it for a variety of reasons.  It is likely
that he sought labor stability as the corporation began to emerge from the Great Depression.
Additionally he was no doubt aware that workers were disillusioned with corporate welfare, a
result of the recent hard times when unemployment could not be avoided.  Also, the atmosphere
of the late 1930s was very different, and the tactics that worked in 1892, 1901, 1909, and 1919,
probably would not work with the federal government supporting workers’ rights.  Finally,
Taylor and Lewis developed an affinity for one another, and their mutual respect might have
swayed Taylor.  Whatever the reason, U. S. Steel had bowed to the recently formed SWOC,
recognizing it as a bargaining agent.10
While U. S. Steel recognized the workers fairly quickly, the real fight of the SWOC was
in “Little Steel.”  In 1943 and 1944, Weirton Steel again stymied unionization of its mills by
discharge and intimidation, firing over 100 workers on each occasion.11  The Wheeling Steel
Corporation was finally forced to give into the SWOC and the NLRB in 1942 after having
remained non-union since the 1921 strike.
Conclusion
Wheeling’s iron and steel industry developed slowly over the entire 19th century.  When
confronted by competition from the wire nail, local businessmen adjusted and converted their
mills to tin plate production.  With the series of mergers at the end of that century, managers no
longer had the option to be flexible.  Instead, orders came from the corporate offices of U. S.
Steel, and executives there had no loyalty to Wheeling or to Wheeling’s plants.  Likewise, labor
policies were dictated by the executive committee.  While there had always been struggles
between management and labor in Wheeling, local workers and managers alike were now only
actors on a national stage.  The culmination of this was the 1909-1910 strike.  Despite having
remained strongly unionized in their district, Wheeling area steelworkers could no longer win
strikes through local solidarity.  The politics of the national labor organizations and the
corporations had become more significant in determining the outcome of such struggles.
Recognizing this, workers sought solidarity on a national level by trying to change their trade
union into an industrial union.  When that failed, even their local solidarity was broken as many
joined rival organizations or abandoned the labor movement altogether looking to politics to
bring change.  With the labor movement fractured, the local, independent steel companies found
it easier to drive the unions from their mills.  The result was an era that lasted from World War I
until 1937 when steelworkers had no control over their working conditions.
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